# All Relevant 2AC Blocks

## Disad

### Politics (Debt Ceiling)

#### Obama is taking a loss on guns immigration and the economy

Frumin 9/21 (Aliyah Frumin, MSNBC, <http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/09/21/bright-prospects-for-obama-on-foreign-agenda-domestic-in-chaos/>, 9/21/2013)

Obama’s domestic agenda, on the other hand, is completely in crisis. The U.S. is on the verge of a government shutdown if Democrats and Republicans can’t come up with a deal, the Tea Party is engaged in a quixotic quest to destroy Obamacare, and gun control and immigration reform seem increasingly unlikely to become law.¶ All this after a bloody week of gun violence in which gunman Aaron Alexis killed 12 people at the Washington Navy Yard, and an additional 13 people were injured, including a 3-year-old boy, following a gang-related shooting at a basketball court in Obama’s adopted hometown of Chicago.¶ Not even a year into Obama’s second term, and the president is getting hammered on all of these domestic problems from critics on both the left and right. And with so many issues piling up, so many expectations to live up to, and so many constituencies to please all at once, Obama faces the very real risk of accomplishing nothing, and having an empty second term.¶ “The pressure is definitely mounting,” said Jamie Chandler a political science professor at Hunter College.

#### EPA battles will cost capital

Wolfgang 9/20/13 (Ben, "EPA Coal Rules tigheter Than Expected, Will Fuel Backlash in Congress")

The [Environmental Protection Agency](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/environmental-protection-agency/)’s dramatic new power plant emissions standards already have touched off a firestorm within the coal industry and on Capitol Hill, with top Republicans promising to fight tooth-and-nail against President Obama’s climate-change agenda.¶ The [EPA](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/environmental-protection-agency/), the leading actor in the [White House](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/white-house/)’s ambitious global-warming initiative, released the limits on Friday. Hopes that they’d be much less stringent than previous proposals proved to be misplaced.¶ Coal-state lawmakers from both parties are promising to push back.

#### Syria,

#### Summers,

#### and Spying thump

Lind 9/18/13 (Michael, Policy Network, Policy Director of the New America Foundation's Economic Growth Program, "Three Defeats on Home Turf")

The collapse of his Syria policy and of the Summers nomination has inflicted two major blows on President Obama. These have come in quick succession, following widespread public outrage over the extent of US spying on American citizens and foreign nationals in the wake of the Snowden revelations. On all three issues — government surveillance, Syria and Summers — Obama has faced deep opposition from his own Democratic base. Second-term presidents are always “lame ducks,” but this second-term president goes into contentious debt ceiling negotiations with Republicans later this fall with unusually depleted political capital, for a president who was decisively re-elected less than a year ago.

#### Double bind-

#### Republican obstructionism inevitable- PC not key

Reuters 9/18/13 ("White House Says Republicans Moving Away From Compromise On Debt Limit")

The White House said on Wednesday that the House of Representatives had moved away from trying to reach a deal to avoid a debt default with a plan to link an increase of the U.S. debt ceiling to cuts to President [Barack Obama's](http://www.reuters.com/people/barack-obama?lc=int_mb_1001) healthcare program.¶ "House Republicans have decided to pursue a path away from the center, away from compromise, in favor of voting on a piece of legislation that they know will not become law," said White House spokesman Jay Carney.¶ "A faction of the House of Representatives, the House Republicans, is driving this thing in the wrong direction, (and) could bring us closer to a wholly unnecessary and damaging shutdown of the government," he said.

#### Or raise inevitable

Hertig 9/15/13 (Alyssa, Politics for Policy Mic, "Debt Ceiling 2013: We Will Raise the Debt Ceiling, Even Though 55% Of Americans Don't Want To")

The debt ceiling was [first imposed](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/history-lesson-why-did-congress-create-a-national-debt-limit/2013/01/13/21114db8-5db8-11e2-9940-6fc488f3fecd_blog.html) in 1917 amid cries for accountability before President Woodrow Wilson led the United States into World War I. Before the debt-ceiling raise in 2011, James K. Galbraith summarized in Salon:¶ "The debt ceiling was first enacted in 1917. Why? The date tells all: we were about to enter the Great War. To fund that effort, the Wilson government needed to issue Liberty Bonds. This was controversial, and the debt ceiling was cover, passed to reassure the rubes that Congress would be “responsible” even while the country went to war. It was, from the beginning, an exercise in bad faith and has remained so every single second to the present day."¶ It has been raised dozens of times since its inception and 14 times since the turn of the century. It is a meaningless formality.¶ Despite the unpopularity of another raise and demands for a stricter budget (as the Reason-Rupe survey also demonstrates), we will see faux sparks fly between Democrats and Republicans in October, but ultimately the ceiling will be raised.

#### Political capital not key to debt

Klein 9/18/13 (Ezra, Editor of Wonkblog Columnist at the Washington Post, "The White House Doesn't Think It Can Prevent a Government Shutdown")

2) In 2011, the White House was willing to deal. The White House believed, in its gut, that Republicans had been given a mandate in the 2010 elections to extract exactly the kind of concessions they were demanding. In addition, the White House believed President Obama would be a likelier bet for reelection if he could cut a "grand bargain" with the newly resurgent Republicans, taking their key issue away from them.¶ This year, it's the White House that won the last election, and so they see no popular legitimacy behind Republican demands. In addition, they are deeply, fervently committed to the proposition that they will never again negotiate around the debt ceiling, as that's a tactic history will judge them harshly for repeatedly enabling. So even if Boehner could cut a deal on the debt ceiling, the White House isn't open to negotiating.¶ All of which helps explain the White House's more alarmist communications strategy. In 2011, the White House was confident they could cut a deal with Republicans and, in some ways, eager to do so. That gave them a sense of control over the situation.¶ This year, they're not willing to cut a deal with the Republicans on the debt ceiling, and they're not sure the Republicans can cut a deal with themselves on funding the government, all of which means the White House doesn't have much control over this situation. That's why they're trying to worry [business](http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/obama-seeks-business-communitys-help-in-pressing-for-a-deal-on-budget-debt-limit/2013/09/18/74095688-200d-11e3-94a2-6c66b668ea55_story.html) and Wall Street and other outside actors who could put pressure on the GOP.

#### Obama XO

Polman 9/19/13 (Dick, Writer for National Interest, "National Interest: How Obama CAn Stop the Apocalypse")

But, in the interests of protecting our credit rating, and ensuring that Uncle Sam keeps paying his bills, Obama can thwart apocalypse any time he wants to. The weapon is the 14th amendment of the U.S. Constitution. I've italicized the relevant passages of Section 4:¶ "The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned."¶ This section was adopted shortly after the Civil War. The feds feared that ex-Confederate sympathizers, newly elected to Congress from southern states, might try for their own partisan reasons to meddle with the Union's borrowing authority - and hence, its ability to pay its bills. That's why the 14th amendment says that the public debt "shall not be questioned."¶ Lots of legal scholars, and a former president, cited the amendment two years ago, when the GOP was making a similar kamikaze effort (an unsuccessful effort that nonetheless did major damage, prompting the Dow to drop 2000 points and goading Standard and Poor's to downgrade the U.S. credit rating). Back then, Bill Clinton urged Obama to raise the debt ceiling unilaterally because "the Constitution is clear." If it were up to him, he'd raise it "without hesitation, and force the courts to stop me."¶ And Jack Balkin, a constitutional law expert at Yale, insisted that the courts wouldn't stop Obama. Writing on his blog, Balkin said: "(Section 4) was stated in broad terms in order to prevent future majorities in Congress from repudiating the federal debt to gain political advantage, to seek political revenge, or to try to disavow previous financial obligations...It's an argument for emergency powers. If all else fails, and we are in an emergency situation, the president may act to stabilize the situation."¶ But when Obama was asked about this constitutional provision back in July '11, he shrugged it off: "I have talked to my lawyers. They are not persuaded that that is a winning argument."¶ To which I say: Stuff the lawyers. Put an end to this right-wing nonsense, once and for all. Just lead already.

#### Treasury checks

Los Angeles Times 9/10/13 ("US Will Hit Debt Limit Bewteen Oct. 18 and Nov. 5 Analysis Says")

A more likely scenario, based on statements Treasury officials made in a 2012 inspector general's report, would be to delay payments, the analysis said.¶ The Treasury Department could wait until it received enough money to pay a specific day's bills. The delays would start out short but would build over time.¶ For example, if the Treasury hit its borrowing authority on Oct. 18, payments to Medicare and Medicaid providers due that day would be delayed one business day, to Oct. 21. But Social Security checks, veterans benefits and active-duty military pay due to be issued on Nov. 1 would not go out until Nov. 13.¶ The government technically hit the debt limit in May. But the Treasury has been using what it calls "extraordinary measures" since then to juggle the nation's finances and continue paying its bills. Those measures included suspending investments in some federal pension funds and in a currency exchange rate fund.¶ Those actions had the potential to give Treasury about $303 billion in additional money to pay the nation's bills. As of Aug. 31, Treasury had about $108 billion of that cushion left to use, the analysis said.

#### US economic collapse imminent now

Jeff Shjarback (MBA, Digital Marketing Consultant for finance professionals) September 6, 2013 “U.S. economy showing signs of imminent financial collapse” <http://wallstreetsectorselector.com/2013/09/is-a-financial-collapse-imminent-for-u-s-economy/>

The American government and economy is in rather dire circumstances due to an overwhelming series of decisions which are shaping our entire country for the next few decades and likely beyond.¶ As we take a look at the overall track record of our economy, we find that a financial collapse is more than just likely – it may be highly imminent.¶ But why? Why is our government, as massive and established as it is, finding itself in a downward trajectory with little to stop it? Since 1776, we have continuously built up efforts towards being a global powerhouse, and circa-1944 around the close of World War II, we arguably achieved it. Reinstating Israel. Destroying the Nazis. Rebuilding Japan. The United States became the heartfelt center of our entire world.¶ However, politics continued and finances became less stable, causing inflation to rise to astounding rates. Our financial collapse could be quite imminent and three core trends lead us to this theory.¶ Billionaires Dumping Their Stocks¶ A financial collapse would undoubtedly consist of billionaires unloading their stocks in droves. Unfortunately, this is already occurring. On the surface, the stock market (NYSEARCA:DIA) is surfacing from an ugly few years. Numbers are steadily rising, and the stability in the stock market is starting to be set once again.¶ But this trickle-down effect applies in the market. Arguably, the greatest stock investor is Warren Buffet. For better or worse, millions follow his steps because he is so unbelievably successful, and billionaire stock investors follow his investment moves. So when Warren Buffet sells $19 million worth of stock in Johnson & Johnson (NYSE:JNJ) and 21% of his overall stock in consumer spending, others follow suit with the same general strategies. Billionaire, John Paulson, also unloaded 14 million shares in JPMorgan Chase (NYSE:JPM), as reported at Money News.¶ The overall predictions state that the stock market may witness a 90% overall collapse. Though many are aghast at the numbers, those who predicted this have been notoriously accurate in the past. Robert Weidemer, PHD is open about this prediction. His acclaimed team predicted the sub prime mortgage crisis and consumer spending collapse a few years earlier.¶ The World is Suffering Financially¶ When the financial system collapses, other countries will follow suit with their own level of disaster. Unfortunately, again, this is already occurring at alarming rates. Greece has been essentially bankrupt for close to five years running. According to Simon Black of the Economic Collapse Blog, the situation is dire in the country. ‘There are roughly 11 million people in this country. 3.4 million of them are employed, of which roughly one third work for the government.’¶ These unemployment rates are shocking. Italy is no better off. The country’s unemployment rate is currently 12.2%, the highest in 35 years. Furthermore, Italy witnesses 134 retail closings each and every day. Doing the math, one can calculate close to 1,000 employees are becoming not-so-much employed every single day.¶ Investment Bank Over-Loaning and Over-Spending¶ This specific situation is astonishingly convoluted, and would take a series of books and essays and documentaries to even scratch the surface. But in its purest form, the investment banking companies are simply spending money they do not have. Due to excessive loan expenditures in the last decade plus, banks found they were not earning the income back. This, of course, caused the massive mortgage crisis that almost ended the country financially, however, the banks are not out of the situation yet.¶ They still spend more than what is being brought in, and their overall closing of the doors for loans is destroying small business. Furthermore, Jim Willie, popular economist, is reporting that Deutsche Bank is on the brink of a full collapse. Considering their magnitude in the financial sphere, this could send momentous shockwaves throughout the economy.¶ There is a light at the end of the tunnel, if we take serious steps immediately to rectify the situation. However, with each passing day, the light closes and we are further left in the dark emptiness of financial ruin if we continue on this path.

#### Unique link turn- drones fights now- plan ends those

Sink and Herb ’13 (Jeremy Herb and Justin Sink, “Obama faces turning point on administration drone policy”, <http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/policy-and-strategy/286945-obama-faces-turning-point-on-drones>, March 8, 2013)

A 13-hour filibuster by Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) has thrust the expanded use of drone attacks to greater public scrutiny and is putting new pressure on the White House to explain its use of drones to Congress and the public. The same day Paul went to the Senate floor to press President Obama on whether drones could be used to kill American citizens within U.S. borders, Attorney General Eric Holder said Obama would soon speak to the public about the U.S. drone policy. The public address by Obama highlights the administration’s understanding that it needs to give a fuller account of a program that is a hallmark of Obama’s counter-terrorism policy — but that was a covert policy not publicly acknowledged by the government just months ago. It also suggests Obama is close to codifying a set of principles to govern the use of drone strikes for future administrations, which will govern in a world where links to terrorism are less clear and other countries are also using drones. The effort began before last year's election, born from a desire within the White House to provide Mitt Romney with a clear set of procedures and standards for the use of drone strikes, were he to be elected. “He thinks these are important issues,” White House press secretary Jay Carney said Thursday. “He believes very much in the need to be as transparent as possible on these matters with Congress as well as with the public.” Paul declared “victory” Thursday after his filibuster prompted the Obama administration to send the Kentucky senator a letter saying the president could not use drones to kill U.S. citizens on U.S. soil. “It has come to my attention that you have now asked an additional question: ‘Does the President have the authority to use a weaponized drone to kill an American not engaged in combat on American soil?’ ” Holder wrote to Paul. “The answer to that question is no.” The Holder letter is just the latest disclosure from the administration shedding light on a program in the shadows. In January, NBC News obtained a Justice Department white paper explaining the legal authority for drone-killings of senior operational leaders of al Qaeda, even if they were U.S. citizens. Last year, the New York Times reported that the president had personally overseen the development of a top-secret “kill list” identifying potential targets. Obama himself pledged greater transparency in this year’s State of the Union address. “My administration has worked tirelessly to forge a durable legal and policy framework to guide our counterterrorism operations,” said Obama, who pledged in the “months ahead” to explain policies in an “even more transparent” way. It’s a major shift for the White House, which did not publicly acknowledge the use of drones until April 2012, when John Brennan — whose confirmation as CIA Director was held up Wednesday by Paul’s filibuster — gave the first speech about the program. Both the Defense Department and CIA have an arsenal of armed drones, which are used primarily to target terrorists in areas where the U.S. military is not: Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Yet there are more questions about the drone attacks than answers. For example, the administration has not disclosed how many people have been killed by drone strikes in their expanded use under Obama. Some lawmakers, including Paul, have challenged the constitutionality of such attacks. In 2011, New Mexico-born Anwar al-Awlaki was killed in a drone strike in Yemen. Awlaki was an al Qaeda leader connected to attacks against the United States, including the attempted “underwear bombing” of a flight to Detroit in 2009. Heather Hurlburt, executive director of the liberal-leaning National Security Network, said that the issue began getting more public attention last year, but the presidential campaign had curtailed public engagement from the administration. Now that may be changing. “This is an issue that was sort of starting to reach a bubbling point where there was talk inside and outside government about assessing the program,” Hulburt said. “What I think the White House is now doing is picking up the public conversation, the seeds of which were in place before the campaign got really hot.” The drone debate cuts across party lines, with Paul aligned with liberal Democrats like Sen. Ron Wyden (Ore.), the lone Democrat to join Wednesday’s filibuster. There were questions Thursday over why more Democrats didn’t join Paul when many of them have the same concerns about Executive Branch overreach on drones. Wyden said that he expected to see more scrutiny from Congress over the classified program going forward. “I thought it was a day when people would see that this concern about the balance between liberty and security is a bipartisan one,” Wyden said of the filibuster. “I think you’re going to start seeing the emergence as what I sometimes call around here the checks and balances caucus. And there will be a lot of Democrats in it.” While Paul’s filibuster received support from more than a dozen Republicans — including Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) — he was slammed Thursday by defense hawks Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.). McCain described some of Paul’s arguments as “ridiculous,” and that some of his colleagues who joined Paul should “know better.” He bristled at questions over whether support of the filibuster signified a shift in his party’s foreign policy views. “I have no idea, nor do I care,” McCain said. “I could care less if my view is majority or minority — I know what’s right. I’ve been involved in national security for 60 years.” Paul shot back that McCain was “dismissive” of a legitimate issue. “What I would say is that he’s wrong — the issue is a very important issue,” Paul told reporters. “He’s dismissive of something that involves the discussion of whether the 5th Amendment applies to American citizens and I consider that to be a very important issue.” Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), who did not take part in the filibuster, said Paul had shaken things up in the Senate. “There is a sensitivity and a deep concern among the American people that too much power is being arrogated here,” Sessions said. “The president doesn’t have power to just execute somebody, and I think that concern needs to be heard. And Rand Paul made it heard last night.”

#### The plan is popular

Jakes ’13 (Lara Jakes, Associated Press, “Some in Congress back limits on drone strikes”, <http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20130205/NEWS/302050314/Some-Congress-back-limits-drone-strikes>, February 5, 2013)

WASHINGTON — Uncomfortable with the Obama administration's use of deadly drones, a growing number in Congress is looking to limit America's authority to kill suspected terrorists, even U.S. citizens. The Democratic-led outcry was emboldened by the revelation in a newly surfaced Justice Department memo that shows drones can strike against a wider range of threats, with less evidence, than previously believed. The drone program, which has been used from Pakistan across the Middle East and into North Africa to find and kill an unknown number of suspected terrorists, is expected to be a top topic of debate when the Senate Intelligence Committee grills John Brennan, the White House's pick for CIA chief, at a hearing Thursday. The White House on Tuesday defended its lethal drone program by citing the very laws that some in Congress once believed were appropriate in the years immediately after the Sept. 11 attacks but now think may be too broad. "It has to be in the agenda of this Congress to reconsider the scope of action of drones and use of deadly force by the United States around the world because the original authorization of use of force, I think, is being strained to its limits," Sen. Chris Coons, D-Del., said in a recent interview. Rep. Steny Hoyer of Maryland, the No. 2 Democrat in the House, said Tuesday that "it deserves a serious look at how we make the decisions in government to take out, kill, eliminate, whatever word you want to use, not just American citizens but other citizens as well." Hoyer added: "We ought to carefully review our policies as a country." The Senate Foreign Relations Committee likely will hold hearings on U.S. drone policy, an aide said Tuesday, and chairman Robert Menendez, D-N.J., and the panel's top Republican, Sen. Bob Corker, both have quietly expressed concerns about the deadly operations. And earlier this week, a group of 11 Democratic and Republican senators urged President Obama to release a classified Justice Department legal opinion justifying when U.S. counterterrorism missions, including drone strikes, can be used to kill American citizens abroad. Without those documents, it's impossible for Congress and the public to decide "whether this authority has been properly defined, and whether the president's power to deliberately kill Americans is subject to appropriate limitations and safeguards," the senators wrote. It was a repeated request after receiving last June an unclassified Justice Department memo, which fell short of giving the senators all the information they requested. First detailed publicly by NBC News late Monday, the memo for the first time outlines the Obama administration's decision to kill al-Qaida terrorist suspects without any evidence that specific and imminent plots are being planned against the United States. "The threat posed by al-Qaida and its associated forces demands a broader concept of imminence in judging when a person continually planning terror attacks presents an imminent threat," concluded the document. The memo was immediately decried by civil liberties groups as "flawed" and "profoundly disturbing" — especially in light of 2011 U.S. drone strikes in Yemen that killed three American citizens: Anwar al-Awlaki, his 16-year-old-son and Samir Khan. Al-Awlaki was linked to the planning and execution of several attacks targeting U.S. and Western interests, including the attempt to down a Detroit-bound airliner in 2009 and the plot to bomb cargo planes in 2010. His son was killed in a separate strike on a suspected al-Qaida den. Khan was an al-Qaida propagandist. White House spokesman Jay Carney, echoing comments Brennan made in a speech last April, called the strikes "legal, ethical and wise" and said they are covered by a law that Congress approved allowing the use of military force against al-Qaida. "And certainly, under that authority, the president acts in the United States' interest to protect the United States and its citizens from al-Qaida," Carney said Tuesday. "It is a matter of fact that Congress authorized the use of military force against al-Qaida," Carney said. "It is a matter of fact that al-Qaida is in a state of war against us and that senior leaders, operational leaders of al-Qaida are continually plotting to attack the United States, plotting to kill American citizens as they did most horrifically on September 11th of 2001." Three days after 9/11, Congress approved a law authorizing the military to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against al-Qaida and other groups believed to be helping or harboring the global terror network, including the use of drone strikes. In the decade since the attacks, U.S. intelligence officials say, al-Qaida has splintered into a number of affiliates and allied sympathizers. That means the current laws could allow military force against thousands of extremists across the Mideast and North Africa who have limited or no ability to strike the United States. Currently, both the CIA and the U.S. military are authorized to remotely pilot unmanned, missile-carrying drones against terror suspects. It's unknown exactly how many strikes have been carried out, but experts say that drone attacks in Pakistan are conducted by the CIA, while those in Yemen and Somalia, for example, are by military forces. The drones have strained diplomacy between the U.S. and the nations where the strikes are carried out, as civilians have been killed alongside the targeted terrorists, even though most nations have given Washington at least tacit agreement to carry out the attacks. A Middle Eastern diplomat said that in Yemen, for example, an uptick of U.S. drone strikes last month have killed dozens of people and upset the local public, leading some leaders in Sanaa to reconsider how often they should be used. The diplomat spoke Tuesday on condition of anonymity to avoid political retribution from the Obama administration. The Pentagon is also considering basing surveillance drones in Niger to monitor on burgeoning extremist violence in North Africa, but it's not clear if they will be armed. Scaling back the use of drones also would hamper war plans in Afghanistan after combat troops are scheduled to withdraw in 2014. Drones represent a major thrust of the post-troops campaign to help the limited number of special forces units that remain there keep the Taliban from regrouping. Brennan, who currently serves as the White House counterterrorism czar, has signaled he is prepared to turn the CIA from carrying out lethal drone strikes and hand over those missions to the U.S. military. Sen. Ron Wyden, a senior Democratic member of the Senate Intelligence panel, declared himself unsatisfied Tuesday with the Justice memo and said he will press Brennan at the confirmation hearing about the administration's current policy. The drone debate puts Obama, a former civil rights lawyer, in the awkward position of carrying out lethal attacks in secret and bucking his political allies in the Democratic Party. Democratic lawmakers were incensed by the refusal of the Republican administration of President George W. Bush to hand over classified Justice Department opinions justifying the use of waterboarding, the harsh interrogation tactic that critics call a form of torture. Obama repudiated those methods — and released those opinions — when he took office in 2009. The use of drones proved to have no political cost to Obama in his re-election campaign. House Intelligence Chairman Mike Rogers, R-Mich., defended the use of deadly drones, calling it "a lawful act of national self-defense." "When an individual has joined al-Qaida — the organization responsible for the murder of thousands of Americans — and actively plots future attacks against U.S. citizens, soldiers, and interests around the world, the U.S. government has both the authority and the obligation to defend the country against that threat," Rogers said in a statement. But Rep. Keith Ellison, said the new Justice memo could spur lawmakers into taking a fresh look at deadly drones, and what he called an outdated policy guiding them. "We are sort of running on the steam that we acquired right after our country was attacked in the most horrific act of terror in U.S. history," said Ellison, D-Minn. "We have learned much since 9/11, and now it's time to take a more sober look at where we should be with use of force."

#### PC theory is wrong- winners win

Hirsh ’13 (National Journal chief correspondent, citing various political scientists, Michael, former Newsweek senior correspondent, "There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital," National Journal, 2-9-13, www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207, accessed 2-8-13, mss]

The idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and [they]he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.” ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because [they’re]he’s aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.)

#### Impact empirically denied

**Barnett ‘9** (Thomas P.M. Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” 8/25/2009)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how **globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape**. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: \* No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); \* The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); \* Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); \* No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); \* A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and \* No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that is likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the **W**orld **T**rade **O**rganization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward **f**ree-**t**rade **a**greement**s** have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

#### Econ resilient, US isn’t key, and impact empirically denied

**Lamy ’11**(Pascal Lamy is the Director-General of the World Trade Organization. Lamy is Honorary President of Paris-based think tank Notre Europe. Lamy graduated from the prestigious Sciences Po Paris, from HEC and ÉNA, graduating second in his year of those specializing in economics. “System Upgrade” BY PASCAL LAMY | APRIL 18, 2011)

**The** bigger **test came with** the 2008-2009 Great Recession, **the first** truly **global recession** since World War II. When the international economy went into free fall, trade went right along with it. Production and supply are today thoroughly global in nature, with most manufactured products made from parts and materials imported from many other countries. These global value chains have a multiplier effect on trade statistics, which explains why, as the global economy contracted by 2 percent in 2009, trade volume shrank by more than 12 percent. This multiplier effect works the other way around as well: **Growth returned** to 4.6 percent and trade volume grew by a record 14.5 percent over the course of 2010. **Projections for trade** in 2011 **are** also **strong**, with WTO economists predicting that trade volume will rise 6.5 percent during the current year. This sharp rebound in trade has proved two essential things: **Markets stayed open despite ever-stronger pressures** to close them, and trade is an indispensible tool for economic recovery, particularly for developing countries, which are more dependent on trade. Shortly after the crisis broke out, we in the WTO began to closely monitor the trade policy response of our member governments. Many were fearful that pressures to impose trade restrictions would prove too powerful for governments to resist. But this is not what happened. Instead, **the system of rules and disciplines**, agreed to over 60 years of negotiations, **held firm**. In **a series of reports** prepared for WTO members and the G-20, we found that **governments acted with great restraint**. At no time did the trade-restrictive measures imposed cover more than 2 percent of world imports. Moreover, the measures used -- anti-dumping duties, safeguards, and countervailing duties to offset export or production subsidies -- were those which, in the right circumstances, are permissible under WTO rules. I am not suggesting that every safeguard measure or countervailing duty imposed during those difficult days was in compliance with WTO rules, but responses to trade pressures were generally undertaken within an internationally agreed-upon framework. Countries by and large resisted overtly noncompliant measures, such as breaking legally binding tariff ceilings or imposing import bans or quotas. As **markets stayed open, trade flows began to shift**, **and countries** that shrugged off the impact of the crisis and **continued to grow** -- **notably China, India, and Brazil** -- **became ever-more attractive markets for countries that were struggling**, **including** those in Europe and **North America**. Trade has been a powerful engine for growth in the developing world, a fact reflected in the far greater trade-to-GDP ratios we see there. In 2010, developing countries' share of world trade expanded to a record 45 percent, and this trend looks set to continue. Decisions made in Brasilia, Beijing, and New Delhi to open their respective economies to trade have been instrumental in enabling these countries to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.

### 1AR- Link Turns

#### Syria magnifies the link turn

Stangler 9/16 (Cole Stangler, Stangler is an In These Times staff writer based in northeast D.C., covering Congress, corruption and politics in Washington. His reporting has appeared in The Huffington Post and The American Prospect, “Will Syria Re-Energize the Anti-Drone Movement?”, <http://inthesetimes.com/article/15627/will_syria_re_energize_the_anti_drone_movement/>, September 16, 2013)

Buoyed by the Syria outcome, anti-war groups are charging ahead. 'This is a war that kills, this is a war that maims, this is a war that has its collateral damage and its victims in spades—even the occasional American citizen who ends up being killed in these attacks without due process.' On Wednesday, Rep. Alan Grayson (D-Fla.) called the temporary blocking of a military intervention in Syria the greatest victory for the peace movement since the end of the war in Vietnam. Grayson, who helped lead opposition in Congress, made the remarks at a monthly roundtable discussion on Capitol Hill organized by Progressive Democrats of America. “I feel very happy that we set a precedent that I think will demonstrate to our peace movement how to succeed,” Grayson later told In These Times. “One of the great shortcomings of modern life for progressives is the near absence of success. And I think here’s a concrete example of where a popular movement made a difference.” The president struggled to obtain a pro-war majority in Congress, where only 23 senators and 25 House representatives came out in support of a bombing campaign. The tepid response Obama’s proposal has received in Congress so far echoes polls that show a wide majority of Americans opposed to an intervention. Many legislators have cited those polling figures in addition to the phone calls they received urging a ‘no vote’ as motivation for their opposition to an intervention. Now that Syria supports a Russian proposal to place its chemical weapons under international control, the United States has, at least for now, prioritized diplomacy over what once seemed like imminent preparations for war. The permanent members of the UN Security Council are now working out the details of a proposal to monitor Syria’s weapons. Like other peace activists, CODEPINK co-founder Medea Benjamin observes how the potential intervention in Syria sparked a revival of the anti-war movement—a once-thriving coalition of organizations that has lost numbers, momentum and often struggled to articulate common positions with a Democrat in the White House. The amount of coordination and consensus that groups like CODEPINK, Win Without War, MoveOn and others reached on Syria harkens back to the anti-war movement during the Iraq War years, several organizers said. “The peace movement has been very weak after Obama came in,” Benjamin says. “In fact, many organizations fell apart or were just a shell of their former selves. And in a week’s time, so many of them just sprung to life again. MoveOn, which hasn’t been involved in peace work and [whom we] couldn’t get interested in working with us on the drone campaign or even opposing the surge in Afghanistan, all of a sudden appeared and started helping to organize over 100 vigils. And so I think it’s amazing to see—with the divisions that existed within the progressive movement and organizations struggling to decide whether to oppose Obama, especially ones that have been very close to the Democratic Party—what we did accomplish.” Stephen Miles, the coordinator of the Win Without War coalition, which formed in opposition to the Iraq War, thinks the anti-war bridge-building around Syria is “not so much a dramatic change as a reactivation and a return to focus. … A lot of the connections [between anti-war groups] have remained … so that when there was a moment of crisis, we were able to use that foundation to jump into action, then to expand and to work with players who hadn’t been as engaged in some of our other fights.” Benjamin believes that the debate over Syria could push a number of Democratic members of Congress to become more outspoken on foreign policy issues. “I think the fact that … Democrats have stood up to the Obama administration has now set a precedent and it will be easier to get them to stand up again,” she says. “Usually they’re so reluctant to secondguess the president.” Benjamin is optimistic that the success of the push against intervention in Syria could bring much-needed attention to the other issues her group works on: closing Guantanamo, ending drone strikes or speeding the planned troop withdrawals from Afghanistan. She says that some feasible short-term goals for the anti-war movement include freeing the detainees eligible for release at Guantanamo, ending the CIA’s use of drones and the practice of “signature strikes,” and bringing more transparency to these targeted killing programs—demands that don’t necessarily require passing legislation, since the administration has the power to change its own practices.

#### Turf battles happening now- specifically *armed drones*- thumps the disad

Munoz ’13 (Carlo Munoz, The Hill, “Turf battle builds quietly in Congress over control of armed drone program”, <http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/292501-turf-battle-builds-quietly-over-control-of-armed-drone-program->, April 9, 2013)

A turf war is quietly building between congressional defense and intelligence committees over who will oversee the Obama administration’s controversial armed drone program. Lawmakers are scrambling to make their case for or against a White House proposal that would hand control of the drones to the Pentagon. Gordon Adams, a senior defense analyst at the Stimson Center, called the looming battle a “turf fight in the [disguise] of a policy debate.” The Pentagon and CIA operate their own armed drone programs, which are both geared toward eliminating senior al Qaeda leaders and other high-level terror targets around the world. Under the Obama administration’s proposal, the CIA would continue to supply intelligence on possible targets, but actual control over the drone strikes would fall to the Pentagon. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) publicly questioned whether the Defense Department (DOD) would be able to shoulder the program alone. “We’ve watched the intelligence aspect of the drone program, how they function, the quality of the intelligence, watching the agency exercise patience and discretion,” Feinstein told reporters in March. “The military [armed drone] program has not done that nearly as well.” Sen. John McCain and other defense lawmakers say the drone program would be better off being run by the Pentagon. “It’s not the job of the Central Intelligence Agency. ... It’s the military’s job,” the Arizona Republican said in March. The fight is a typical battle over who on Capitol Hill will retain power over the program, according to several analysts, who described it as predictable. “There is always going to be a turf battle” when dealing with congressional oversight, said Lawrence Korb, a former DOD official and defense analyst at the liberal-leaning Center for American Progress. But that battle could become particularly heated, given the high-profile nature of the drone program, which since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks has become a huge factor in shaping counterterrorism policy, given its success, Korb said. For congressional panels, the fight over who will control the drone program will have a say in the relevancy of the two committees. Korb, for example, noted that national security spending on unmanned aircraft and special operations forces will likely increase, even as the budget for defense spending overall is expected to trend downward.

### Credibility Disad

#### No uniqueness

Karabell 9/6 (Zachary Karabell, Reuters, President of River Twice Research and River Twice Capital Advisors. His most recent book is Sustainable Excellence: The Future of Business in the 21st Century, “Obama and the End of the Imperial Presidency”, <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/obama-and-the-end-of-the-imperial-presidency/279405/?google_editors_picks=true>, September 6, 2013)

The president's uphill battle to get congressional authorization for the use of force in Syria suggests the pendulum is swinging back from Bush-era excesses. In 1973, Arthur Schlesinger wrote about the tendency in American history for the president to assume sweeping powers in times of war and crisis. The balance of power established by the Constitution gets upended; Congress and the courts take a back seat; and the executive makes decisions about life and death largely unchecked. He called this “the imperial presidency.” Today, with President Obama turning to Congress to endorse a military strike on Syria, the imperial presidency is beginning to wane. It’s about time. The 1990s seemed to presage a return to a more balanced government, with Cold War defense spending slashed and “the peace dividend” contributing to a more balanced budget. But then 9/11 happened; America launched a war on terror; and the rest, as they say, is history. The imperial presidency has some justification in times of acute peril. The immediate aftermath of 9/11 certainly justified some degree of unilateral executive action, as did in its way the financial crisis in the fall of 2008. And few would argue that at times of all-out war, with the country fully mobilized to fight a genuine threat such as Germany and Japan during World War II, ceding powers to the executive branch is imperative. But it is equally vital to pare those back when they are no longer required -- though this is easier said than done. People do not cede power easily, and bureaucracies are far easier to construct than dismantle. The War on Terror has been conducted by an assertive executive branch and a compliant Congress and judiciary. Defenders will say that that’s a good thing, and a necessary one to keep the country safe. Either way, it tilts the balance toward the imperial presidency. It’s a sign of just how far down the imperial path we’ve gone that Obama’s decision to look for congressional authorization before sending missiles into Syria was greeted with surprise and not a little contempt. The decision, apparently made over the weekend before Labor Day, caught even Obama’s aides unawares. And rather than hailing the decision as a sign of respect for the congressional war-making power specified by the Constitution, a fair number of commentators and even congressional representatives decried the move. Rep. Peter King, a New York Republican, denounced the decision in blunt language: “His failure to act was a woeful abdication of the president’s powers as commander-in-chief and sent the entirely wrong signal to an increasingly dangerous world.” The assumption that the president has both the authority and the obligation to strike against Syria because of its use of chemical weapons, and that this authority does not require consultation with Congress, would have astonished generations of Americans. Yes, presidential overreach is hardly a product of recent history, and no, we are better served by treating the Constitution as a “living document” that needs adaptation rather than slavishly cleaving to its every clause, as some devotees of original intent clearly do. However, the degree to which presidents have since the 1950s assumed the power to unilaterally decide to go to war is clearly a level of power unintended by the founders of the United States, undesired by many today, and unconducive to the very openness and transparency of debate and decision-making that forms the foundation of a functional deliberative democracy. There is, in fact, a direct line between the issues raised by Edward Snowden’s revelations of government spying on domestic emails and communications and the near-decision to launch missiles against Syria. This isn’t about whether such policies are the right ones. They were not decided in the right way. That is, the way they were decided assumes not just competence and integrity on the part of the executive but that in most cases, the president is better able to make better decisions than a deliberative body such as Congress. You may think our current Congress is pitiful, but that is always a risk. The Constitution doesn’t say that “Congress shall have the power to declare war … but only if it’s a good Congress.” The point of the American system, at least in theory, is that too many factors play into key societal decisions to make it easy for individuals and institutions invested with great power to exercise that power lightly. That is more true than ever for the United States today. In pure military terms, the United States can do whatever it wants to whomever it wants, and precious few other countries can do a thing about it. As Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, of course, overwhelming military power only gets you so far, unless you are willing to indiscriminately kill civilians and then govern the country you’ve destroyed. And even then, the risks of blowback and failure are large. But in terms of firing missiles or deploying commandos or using drones or any number of military measures, the president can literally say go and it is done. Yes, he needs the consensus of his team, but the power is there. And once the missiles are flying, there is no turning back. That type of power is almost impossible to manage well. The temptation to use it is great. We know that because we use it frequently. China, also powerful in its way, does not. Russia, still well-armed, does not. France did dispatch troops to Mali recently, but even with its nuclear arsenal and not inconsiderable military, force is not a primary option. Those domestic systems are not ones most of us would trade for, yet it bears remembering that they are much less tempted to use force to resolve intractable international issues, including dire human rights abuses. There is one more reason to celebrate the waning of the imperial presidency. For too long, the United States has been locked into a role as the sole guardian of global order. Many Americans want to retain that, but in truth, we play that role selectively and erratically. Obama himself noted the contradictions in an interview with The New Republic and asked how any president could weigh the relative merits of intervening in Syria versus intervening in Congo. The very expectation that the United States must do something throughout the world feeds the domestic expansion of presidential powers. But while those powers grow, the ability and willingness of Americans to act as the global policeman and enforcer is erratic at best. That makes for the worst of possible worlds: an overweening domestic executive and an ineffectual global cop. The shifts afoot are partly structural. Without a clear and present danger, it’s natural that the pendulum begins to move away from the executive branch and toward other centers of influence. But Obama in recent months has been quietly accelerating the shift rather than fighting it. That may prove to be one of his greatest legacies, even though the diminution of presidential power is not the kind of thing that makes for compelling historical narrative. It is, however, exactly the sort of thing that makes for a compelling democracy, and I’d rather live in that than read books years hence about how the imperial presidency drove the country in precisely the wrong direction.

#### International Blowback

Billinger ’11 (John B. Bellinger III, Partner at Arnold & Porter LLP and an adjunct senior fellow in international and national security law at the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as legal adviser for the State Department from 2005 to 2009 and as legal adviser to the National Security Council from 2001 to 2005, “Will drone strikes become Obama’s Guantanamo?”<http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/will-drone-strikes-become-obamas-guantanamo/2011/09/30/gIQA0ReIGL_story_1.html>, October 2, 2011)

The killing of the U.S.-born al- Qaeda cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki on Friday along with another U.S. citizen and two other al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen is likely to fuel the international controversy over the legality and wisdom of the Obama administration’s dramatically increased use of drone attacks. For several years, U.S. allies have made no public comment even as U.S. drone strikes have killed twice as many suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban members than were ever imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay. But that acquiescence may change, as human rights groups and the media focus more attention on the legality and collateral damage of drone attacks. The U.S. drone program has been highly effective in killing senior al-Qaeda leaders, but the administration needs to work harder to explain and defend its use of drones as lawful and appropriate — to allies and critics — if it wants to avoid losing international support and potentially exposing administration officials to legal liability. The U.S. position, under the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, has been that drone strikes against al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders are lawful under U.S. and international law. They are permitted by the September 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force Act, which empowered the president to “all necessary and appropriate force” against nations, organizations or persons who planned, committed or aided the Sept. 11 attacks. The United States also believes that drone strikes are permitted under international law and the United Nations Charter as actions in self-defense, either with the consent of the country where the strike takes place or because that country is unwilling or unable to act against an imminent threat to the United States. U.S. officials have been understandably reluctant to confirm whether consent has been given by particular countries. Obama administration officials have explained in the past that strikes against particular militant leaders are permissible, either because the individuals are part of the overall U.S. conflict with al-Qaeda or because they pose imminent threats to the United States. President Obama emphasized Awlaki’s operational role on Friday, stating that he was the “leader of external operations for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.” The killing of Awlaki raises additional legal concerns because U.S. citizens have certain constitutional rights wherever they are in the world. Some human rights groups have asserted that due process requires prior judicial review before killing an American, but it is unlikely that the Constitution requires judicial involvement in the case of a U.S. citizen engaged in terrorist activity outside this country. Administration lawyers undoubtedly reviewed the targeting of Awlaki even more carefully than of a non-American, and the Justice Department reportedly prepared an opinion concluding that his killing would comply with domestic and international law. This is likely to be considered sufficient due process under U.S. constitutional standards. But the U.S. legal position may not satisfy the rest of the world. No other government has said publicly that it agrees with the U.S. policy or legal rationale for drones. European allies, who vigorously criticized the Bush administration for asserting the unilateral right to use force against terrorists in countries outside Afghanistan, have neither supported nor criticized reported U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Instead, they have largely looked the other way, as they did with the killing of Osama bin Laden. Human rights advocates, on the other hand, while quiet for several years (perhaps to avoid criticizing the new administration), have grown increasingly uncomfortable with drone attacks. Last year, the U.N. rapporteur for summary executions and extrajudicial killings said that drone strikes may violate international humanitarian and human rights law and could constitute war crimes. U.S. human rights groups, which stirred up international opposition to Bush administration counterterrorism policies, have been quick to condemn the Awlaki killing. Even if Obama administration officials are satisfied that drone strikes comply with domestic and international law, they would still be wise to try to build a broader international consensus. The administration should provide more information about the strict limits it applies to targeting and about who has been targeted. One of the mistakes the Bush administration made in its first term was adopting novel counterterrorism policies without attempting to explain and secure international support for them. White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan rightly acknowledged in a recent speech that “the effectiveness of our counterterrorism activities depends on the assistance and cooperation of our allies.” If the Obama administration wants to avoid losing the tacit support (and potentially the operational and intelligence assistance) of its allies for drone strikes and its other counterterrorism policies, it should try to ensure that they understand and agree with the U.S. policy and legal justification. Otherwise, the administration risks having its largely successful drone program become as internationally maligned as Guantanamo.

#### The plan pre-empts larger backlash- Congress key

Anderson ‘9 (Kenneth Anderson, Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University, and Research Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University and Member of its Task Force on National Security and the Law, 5/11/2009, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/5/11%20counterterrorism%20anderson/0511\_counterterrorism\_anderson.pdf)

Obama was right as a candidate and is correct as president to insist on the propriety of targeted killings—that is, the targeting of a specific individual to be killed, increasingly often by means of high technology, remote-controlled Predator drone aircraft wielding missiles from a stand-off position. The strategic logic that presses toward targeted standoff killing as a necessary, available and technologically advancing part of counterterrorism is overpowering. So too is the moral and humanitarian logic behind its use. Just as crucial programs of Predator-centered targeted killing are underway now in Afghanistan and, with increasing international controversy, Pakistan, over the long term these programs of stand-off targeted killing will be an essential element in United States counterterrorism into the future—and with targets having little or nothing to do with today’s iteration of the war on terror.6 Future administrations, even if they naturally prefer to couch the matter in softer terms, will likely follow the same path. Even if the whole notion seems to some disturbingly close to arbitrary killing, not open combat, it is often the most expedient—and, despite civilian casualties that do occur, most discriminatingly humanitarian—manner to neutralize a terrorist without unduly jeopardizing either civilians or American forces. But there’s a paradox in Obama’s embrace of targeted killing: Even as the strategic and humanitarian logic for it increases in persuasiveness, the legal space for it and the legal rationales on which it has been traditionally justified are in danger of shrinking. They are at risk of shrinking in ways that might surprise members of Congress and the Obama Administration. And they are at risk of shrinking through seemingly innocuous, unrelated legal policy actions that the Obama Administration and Congress might be inclined to take in support of various political constituencies, usually related to broadly admirable goals of human rights and international law. American domestic law—the law codifying the existence of the CIA and defining its functions—has long accepted implicitly at least some uses of force, including targeted killing, as self-defense toward ends of vital national security that do not necessarily fall within the strict terms of armed conflict in the sense meant by the Geneva Conventions and other international treaties on the conduct of armed conflict. Categories of the use of force short of armed conflict or war in a juridical sense—by intelligence services such as the CIA, for example—or by military agents in furtherance of national self defense and vital security interests, yet outside of the legal condition of armed conflict, date back in codified law to the founding of the CIA and, in state practice by the United States and other sovereigns, far further still. Yet as a matter of legal justification, successive administrations have already begun to cede this ground. Even the Bush Administration, with its unrivaled enthusiasm for executive power, always sought to cast its killing targets as the killing of combatants in what it legally characterized as armed conflicts, governed by the laws of war on the conduct of hostilities, known as “international humanitarian law” (IHL). This concession, however, if followed by the Obama Administration and beyond, will likely reduce the practical utility of a policy and security tool of both longstanding provenance and proven current value. It will likely reduce the flexibility of the United States to respond to emerging threats before they ripen into yet another war with non-state terrorists, and it will reduce the ability of the United Sates to address terrorist threats in the most discriminating fashion advancing technology permits. At this moment in which many policymakers, members of Congress and serious observers see primarily a need to roll back policies and assertions of authority made by the Bush Administration, any call for the Obama Administration and Congress to insist upon powers of unilateral targeted killing and to claim a zone of authority outside of armed conflict governed by IHL that even the Bush Administration did not claim must seem at once atavistic, eccentric, myopic and perverse. Many will not much care that such legal authority already exists in international and U.S. domestic law. Yet the purpose of this chapter is to suggest that, on the contrary, the uses to which the Obama Administration seeks to put targeted killing are proper, but they will require that it carefully preserve and defend legal authorities it should not be taking for granted and that its predecessors, including the Bush Administration, have not adequately preserved for their present day uses. People who threaten serious harm to the United States will not always be al Qaeda, after all. Nor will they forever be those persons who, in the words of the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), “planned, authorized, committed or aided” the attacks of September 11. As I will explain, it would have been better had the Bush and Clinton Administrations, for their parts, formulated their legal justifications for the targeted uses of force around the legal powers traditionally asserted by the United States: the right of self-defense, including the right to use force even in circumstances not rising to the level of an “armed conflict” in order to have firmly fixed in place the clear legal ability of the United States to respond as it traditionally has. Although the United States still has a long way to go to dismember al Qaeda, its affiliates and subsidiaries, although Osama bin Laden and key al Qaeda terrorist leaders remain at large, and although the President of the United States still exercises sweeping powers both inherent and granted by Congress to use all national power against the perpetrators of September 11, time moves on. New threats will emerge, some of them from states and others from non-state actors, including terrorist organizations. Some of those new threats will be new forms of jihadist terrorism; others will champion new and different causes. Even now, Islamist terror appears to be fragmenting into loose networks of shared ideology and aspiration rather than tightly vertical organizations linked by command and control.8 It will take successive feats of intellectual jujitsu to cast all of the targets such developments will reasonably put in the cross hairs as, legally speaking, combatants. Yet the problem is still deeper and more immediate than that, for the accepted space for targeted killings is eroding even within what a reasonable American might understand as the four corners of our conflict with al Qaeda. In many situations in which any American president, Obama certainly included, would want to use a targeted killing, it is unclear to some important actors—at the United Nations, among our allies, among international law scholars, and among NGO activists—as a matter of international law that a state of armed conflict actually exists or that a targeted killing can qualify as an act of self-defense. The legal situation, therefore, threatens to become one in which, on the one hand, targeted killing outside of a juridical armed conflict is legally impermissible and, on the other hand, as a practical matter, no targeted killing even within the context of a “war” with al Qaeda is legally permissible, either. Congress’s role in this area is admittedly a peculiar one. It is mostly—though not entirely—politically defensive in nature. After all, the domestic legal authorities to conduct targeted killings and other “intelligence” uses of force have existed in statutory form at least since the legislation that established the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 and in other forms long pre-dating that.9 The problem is that although domestic legal authority exists for the use of force against terrorists abroad, currents are stirring in international law and elsewhere that move to undermine that authority. Powerful trend and opinion-setting—so-called “soft law”—currents are developing in ways that, over time, promise to make the exercise of this activity ever more difficult and to create a presumption, difficult to overcome, that targeted killing is in fact both illegitimate and, indeed, per se illegal except in the narrowest of war-like conditions. The role of Congress is therefore to reassert, reaffirm, and reinvigorate the category as a matter of domestic law and policy, and as the considered, official view of the United States as a matter of international law.

#### Status quo backlash undermines war powers

Waxman 8/25/13 (Matthew Waxman is a law professor at Columbia Law School, where he co-chairs the Roger Hertog Program on Law and National Security. He is also Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law. He previously served in senior policy positions at the State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council. After graduating from Yale Law School, he clerked for Judge Joel M. Flaum of the U.S. Court of Appeals and Supreme Court Justice David H. Souter, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War” Forthcoming in YALE LAW JOURNAL, vol. 123, 2014, August 25th DRAFT)

A. Democratic Constraints on the Power to the Threaten Force At first blush, including the power to threaten war or force in our understanding of how the President wields military might seems to suggest a conception of presidential war powers even more expansive in scope and less checked by other branches than often supposed, especially since the President can by threatening force put the United States on a path to war that Congress will have difficulty resisting. That is partially true, though recent political science scholarship reveals that democratic politics significantly constrain the President’s decisions to threaten force and, moreover, that Congress plays important roles in shaping those politics even in the absence of binding legislative action. Whereas most lawyers usually begin their analysis of the President’s and Congress’s war powers by focusing on their formal legal authorities, political scientists usually take for granted these days that the President is – in practice – the dominant branch with respect to military crises and that Congress wields its formal legislative powers in this area rarely or in only very limited ways. A major school of thought, however, is that congressional members nevertheless wield significant influence over decisions about force, and that this influence extends to threatened force, so that Presidents generally refrain from threats that would provoke strong congressional opposition. Even without any serious prospect for legislatively blocking the President’s threatened actions, Congress under certain conditions can loom large enough to force Presidents to adjust their policies; even when it cannot, congressional members can oblige the President expend lots of political capital. As Jon Pevehouse and William Howell explain: Whenmembers of Congressvocally oppose a use of force, they undermine the president’s ability to convince foreign states that he will see a fight through **to the end**. Sensing hesitation on the part of the United States, allies may be reluctant to contribute to a military campaign, and adversaries are likely to fight harder and longer when conflict erupts— thereby raising the costs of the military campaign, decreasing the president’s ability to negotiate a satisfactory resolution, and increasing the probability that American lives are lost along the way. Facing a limited band of allies willing to participate in a military venture and an enemy emboldened by domestic critics, presidents may choose to curtail, and even abandon, those military operations that do not involve vital strategic interests. 145 This statement also highlights the important point, alluded to earlier, that force and threatened force are not neatly separable categories. Often limited uses of force are intended as signals of resolve to escalate, and most conflicts involve bargaining in which the threat of future violence – rather than what Schelling calls “brute force” 146 – is used to try to extract concessions.

## Counterplan

### Self- Restrain

#### Links to politics – immense opposition to bypassing debate

Hallowell ’13 [Billy Hallowell, writer for The Blaze, B.A. in journalism and broadcasting from the College of Mount Saint Vincent in Riverdale, New York and an M.S. in social research from Hunter College in Manhattan, “HERE’S HOW OBAMA IS USING EXECUTIVE POWER TO BYPASS LEGISLATIVE PROCESS” Feb. 11, 2013, <http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/02/11/heres-how-obamas-using-executive-power-to-bylass-legislative-process-plus-a-brief-history-of-executive-orders/>, KB]

“In an era of polarized parties and a fragmented Congress, the opportunities to legislate are few and far between,” Howell said. “So presidents have powerful incentive to go it alone. And they do.”¶ And the political opposition howls.¶ Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., a possible contender for the Republican presidential nomination in 2016, said that on the gun-control front in particular, Obama is “abusing his power by imposing his policies via executive fiat instead of allowing them to be debated in Congress.”¶ The Republican reaction is to be expected, said John Woolley, co-director of the American Presidency Project at the University of California in Santa Barbara.¶ “For years there has been a growing concern about unchecked executive power,” Woolley said. “It tends to have a partisan content, with contemporary complaints coming from the incumbent president’s opponents.”

#### Congress key

#### Future presidential rollback

Harvard Law Review 12, "Developments in the Law: Presidential Authority," Vol. 125:2057, www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol125\_devo.pdf

The recent history of signing statements demonstrates how public opinion can effectively check presidential expansions of power by inducing executive self-binding. It remains to be seen, however, if this more restrained view of signing statements can remain intact, for it relies on the promises of one branch — indeed of one person — to enforce and maintain the separation of powers. To be sure, President Obama’s guidelines for the use of signing statements contain all the hallmarks of good executive branch policy: transparency, accountability, and fidelity to constitutional limitations. Yet, in practice, this apparent constraint (however well intentioned) may amount to little more than voluntary self-restraint. 146 Without a formal institutional check, it is unclear what mechanism will prevent the next President (or President Obama himself) from reverting to the allegedly abusive Bush-era practices. 147 Only time, and perhaps public opinion, will tell.

#### Doesn’t solve signal

Sullivan ’13 (Andrew Sullivan, Obama’s War On Terror Speech: Reax II, <http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2013/05/24/obamas-war-on-terror-speech-reax-ii/>, Freddie deBoer wants more than words, May 24, 2013)

We have lived with this “war on terror” for a third of my life. And liberals: speeches do not walk the dog anymore. The time for flowery speeches is over. It’s time for action. Saying “we’re going to end the AUMF eventually” is not enough. Talking about closing Guantanamo is not enough. It has to actually happen. Like Anthony Romero of the ACLU says, actions are more important than words. If Obama actually closes Guantanamo, I promise I will applaud. If Obama actually reduces or ends the drone campaign, I will celebrate. But those specific policies will only be valuable if they are part of a broad attempt to end the hostilities between the United States and the Muslim world. Given that every Muslim terrorist who announces their motives says that they are based on our incursions into the Muslim world, that can only happen if we withdraw. Yes and yes. My support yesterday for the arguments of the speech is, of course, contingent on actual progress. Friedersdorf is in the same ballpark: All things considered, Thursday’s developments were an improvement on the status quo. Obama constrained himself rhetorically in ways he hadn’t before, expressed agreement with core civil libertarian critiques, and signalled that future policy will shift in that direction as a result. But talk is cheap, Obama has a history of breaking promises to civil libertarians, and drone strikes remain surrounded in enough secrecy that it will remain difficult to verify what’s going on. Moreover, policies implemented at the president’s prerogative can be changed on his determination too. There remains an urgent need for Congress to step into the breach and constrain the president, even if only in the ways that Obama says that he has constrained himself.

#### Law is key to modeling\*

Maxwell ’12 (Mark David Maxwell, Colonel, Judge Advocate with the U.S. Army, TARGETED KILLING, THE LAW, AND TERRORISTS, Joint Force Quarterly, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/targeted-killing.html>, Winter 2012)

The weakness of this theory is that it is not codified in U.S. law; it is merely the extrapolation of international theorists and organizations. The only entity under the Constitution that can frame and settle Presidential power regarding the enforcement of international norms is Congress. As the check on executive power, Congress must amend the AUMF to give the executive a statutory roadmap that articulates when force is appropriate and under what circumstances the President can use targeted killing. This would be the needed endorsement from Congress, the other political branch of government, to clarify the U.S. position on its use of force regarding targeted killing. For example, it would spell out the limits of American lethality once an individual takes the status of being a member of an organized group. Additionally, statutory clarification will give other states a roadmap for the contours of what constitutes anticipatory self-defense and the proper conduct of the military under the law of war. Congress should also require that the President brief it on the decision matrix of articulated guidelines before a targeted killing mission is ordered. As Kenneth Anderson notes, “[t]he point about briefings to Congress is partly to allow it to exercise its democratic role as the people’s representative.”74 The desire to feel safe is understandable. The consumers who buy SUVs are not buying them to be less safe. Likewise, the champions of targeted killings want the feeling of safety achieved by the elimination of those who would do the United States harm. But allowing the President to order targeted killing without congressional limits means the President can manipulate force in the name of national security without tethering it to the law advanced by international norms. The potential consequence of such unilateral executive action is that it gives other states, such as North Korea and Iran, the customary precedent to do the same. Targeted killing might be required in certain circumstances, but if the guidelines are debated and understood, the decision can be executed with the full faith of the people’s representative, Congress. When the decision is made without Congress, the result might make the United States feel safer, but the process eschews what gives a state its greatest safety: the rule of law.

#### The counterplan HURTS Obama’s credibility- seen as continuing to circumvent Congress\*

Goldsmith ’13 (Jack Goldsmith, Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, where he teaches and writes about national security law, presidential power, cybersecurity, international law, internet law, foreign relations law, and conflict of laws. Before coming to Harvard, Professor Goldsmith served as Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel from 2003-2004, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense from 2002-2003, “How Obama Undermined the War on Terror The President promised not to undercut the rule of law for expedience's sake. He did. Now we face the consequences”, <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112964/obamas-secrecy-destroying-american-support-counterterrorism>, May 1, 2013)

Questions grew when the administration continued to withhold legal memos from Congress, and when John Brennan danced around the issue during his confirmation hearings to be director of the CIA. Senator Rand Paul then cleverly asked Brennan whether the president could order a drone to kill a terrorist suspect inside the United States. When Brennan and Attorney General Eric Holder seemed to prevaricate, Paul conducted his now-famous filibuster. "I cannot sit at my desk quietly and let the president say that he will kill Americans on American soil who are not actively attacking the country," Paul proclaimed. The president never said, or suggested, any such thing. But with trust in Obama falling fast, Paul was remarkably successful in painting the secret wars abroad as a Constitution-defying threat to American citizens at home. Paul's filibuster attracted attention to the issue of drone attacks on Americans in the homeland. A more serious challenge to the president comes from growing concerns, including within his own party, about the legal integrity of his secret wars abroad. Anne-Marie Slaughter, a former senior official in Obama's State Department, recently gainsaid "the idea that this president would leave office having dramatically expanded the use of drones—including [against] American citizens—without any public standards and no checks and balances." Many in Congress want to increase the transparency of the processes and legal standards for placing a suspect (especially an American) on a targeting list, to tighten those legal standards (perhaps by recourse to a "drone court"), and to establish a more open accounting of the consequences (including civilian casualties) from the strikes. "This is now out in the public arena, and now it has to be addressed," Senator Dianne Feinstein, a Democrat, recently said. Others in Congress worry about the obsolescence of the legal foundation for the way of the knife: the congressional authorization, in 2001, of force against Al Qaeda. "I don't believe many, if any, of us believed when we voted for [the authorization] that we were voting for the longest war in the history of the United States and putting a stamp of approval on a war policy against terrorism that, 10 years plus later, we're still using," said Senator Richard Durbin, also a Democrat, in a Wall Street Journal interview. "What are the checks and balances of the system?" he asked. Senator John McCain, who led bipartisan efforts against what he saw as Bush-era legal excesses, is now focusing similar attention on Obama. "I believe that we need to revisit this whole issue of the use of drones, who uses them, whether the CIA should become their own air force, what the oversight is, [and] what the legal and political foundations [are] for this kind of conflict," he said last month. These are unhappy developments for the president who in his first inaugural address pledged with supercilious confidence that, unlike his predecessor, he would not expend the "rule of law" for "expedience's sake." Obama reportedly bristles at the legal and political questions about his secret war, and the lack of presidential trust that they imply. "This is not Dick Cheney we're talking about here," he recently pleaded to Democratic senators who complained about his administration's excessive secrecy on drones, according to Politico. And yet the president has ended up in this position because he committed the same sins that led Cheney and the administration in which he served to a similar place. The first sin is an extraordinary institutional secrecy that Obama has long promised to reduce but has failed to. In part this results from any White House's inevitable tendency to seek maximum protection for its institutional privileges and prerogatives. The administration's disappointing resistance to sharing secret legal opinions about the secret war with even a small subset of Congress falls into this category. But the point goes deeper, for secrecy is the essence of the type of war that Obama has chosen to fight. The intelligence-gathering in foreign countries needed for successful drone strikes there cannot be conducted openly. Nor can lethal operations in foreign countries easily be acknowledged. Foreign leaders usually insist on non-acknowledgment as a condition of allowing American operations in their territories. And in any event, an official American confirmation of the operations might spark controversies in those countries that would render the operations infeasible. The impossible-to-deny bin Laden raid was a necessary exception to these principles, and the United States is still living with the fallout in Pakistan. For official secrecy abroad to work, the secrets must be kept at home as well. In speeches, interviews, and leaks, Obama's team has tried to explain why its operations abroad are lawful and prudent. But to comply with rules of classified information and covert action, the explanations are conveyed in limited, abstract, and often awkward terms. They usually raise more questions than they answer—and secrecy rules often preclude the administration from responding to follow-up questions, criticisms, and charges. As a result, much of what the administration says about its secret war—about civilian casualties, or the validity of its legal analysis, or the quality of its internal deliberations—seems incomplete, self-serving, and ultimately non-credible. These trust-destroying tendencies are exacerbated by its persistent resistance to transparency demands from Congress, from the press, and from organizations such as the aclu that have sought to know more about the way of the knife through Freedom of Information Act requests. A related sin is the Obama administration's surprising failure to secure formal congressional support. Nearly every element of Obama's secret war rests on laws—especially the congressional authorization of force (2001) and the covert action statute (1991)—designed for different tasks. The administration could have worked with Congress to update these laws, thereby forcing members of Congress to accept responsibility and take a stand, and putting the secret war on a firmer political and legal foundation. But doing so would have required extended political efforts, public argument, and the possibility that Congress might not give the president precisely what he wants. The administration that embraced the way of the knife in order to lower the political costs of counterterrorism abroad found it easier to avoid political costs at home as well. But this choice deprived it of the many benefits of public argumentation and congressional support. What Donald Rumsfeld said self-critically of Bush-era unilateralism applies to Obama's unilateralism as well: it fails to "take fully into account the broader picture—the complete set of strategic considerations of a president fighting a protracted, unprecedented and unfamiliar war for which he would need sustained domestic and international support." Instead of seeking contemporary congressional support, the administration has relied mostly on government lawyers' secret interpretive extensions of the old laws to authorize new operations against new enemies in more and more countries. The administration has great self-confidence in the quality of its stealth legal judgments. But as the Bush administration learned, secret legal interpretations are invariably more persuasive within the dark circle of executive branch secrecy than when exposed to public sunlight. On issues ranging from proper targeting standards, to the legality of killing American citizens, to what counts as an "imminent" attack warranting self-defensive measures, these secret legal interpretations—so reminiscent of the Bushian sin of unilateral legalism—have been less convincing in public, further contributing to presidential mistrust. Feeling the heat from these developments, President Obama promised in his recent State of the Union address "to engage with Congress to ensure not only that our targeting, detention, and prosecution of terrorists remains consistent with our laws and system of checks and balances, but that our efforts are even more transparent to the American people and to the world." So far, this promise, like similar previous ones, remains unfulfilled. The administration has floated the idea of "[shifting] the CIA's lethal targeting program to the Defense Department," as The Daily Beast reported last month. Among other potential virtues, this move might allow greater public transparency about the way of the knife to the extent that it would eliminate the covert action bar to public discussion. But JSOC's non-covert targeted killing program is no less secretive than the CIA's, and its congressional oversight is, if anything, less robust. A bigger problem with this proposed fix is that it contemplates executive branch reorganization followed, in a best-case scenario, by more executive branch speeches and testimony about what it is doing in its stealth war. The proposal fails to grapple altogether with the growing mistrust of the administration's oblique representations about secret war. The president cannot establish trust in the way of the knife through internal moves and more words. Rather, he must take advantage of the separation of powers. Military detention, military commissions, and warrantless surveillance became more legitimate and less controversial during the Bush era because adversarial branches of government assessed the president's policies before altering and then approving them. President Obama should ask Congress to do the same with the way of the knife, even if it means that secret war abroad is harder to conduct. Administration officials resist this route because they worry about the outcome of the public debate, and because the president is, as The Washington Post recently reported, "seen as reluctant to have the legislative expansion of another [war] added to his legacy." But the administration can influence the outcome of the debate only by engaging it. And as Mazzetti makes plain, the president's legacy already includes the dramatic and unprecedented unilateral expansion of secret war. What the president should be worried about for legacy purposes is that this form of warfare, for which he alone is today responsible, is increasingly viewed as illegitimate.

## Topicality

### 2AC- “Targeted Killing”

#### We meet and our aff is key to topic education

**Zenko ’12** [Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, “Targeted Killings and Signature Strikes,” June 16, <http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/07/16/targeted-killings-and-signature-strikes/>]

No matter how U.S. officials (secretly) refer to the practice, signature strikes against military-age men have been part of U.S. targeted killings outside of battlefields from their beginning. In fact, the very first targeted killing was a signature strike.¶ After a year-long manhunt and several missed opportunities by Yemeni soldiers, on November 3, 2002, a fusion of human intelligence assets and signals intercepts pinpointed Abu Ali al-Harithi—an operational planner in the al-Qaeda cell that bombed the USS Cole in 2002—and his bodyguards living in the Marib region near the border with Saudi Arabia. Yemeni and U.S. forces on the ground, supported by a Predator drone circling above, were monitoring al-Harithi’s group when they left a compound in two Toyota SUVs. All of the men were in one vehicle and the women in the other. According to an unnamed U.S. official, “If the women hadn’t gotten into another car, we wouldn’t have fired.” (A member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence later wondered, “What do we do, next time, if the women get into the car?”)¶ Reportedly, the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted a satellite phone call coming from the SUV filled with men. After an NSA analyst—who had listened to tapes of al-Harithi’s voice for years—heard confirming evidence, he shouted: “He’s in the backseat, and he’s giving the driver directions!” With that confirmation, a CIA-controlled Predator drone was authorized to fire a single Hellfire missile, which destroyed the SUV and killed al-Harithi, four unknown Yemenis, and Ahmed Hijazi (otherwise known as Kemal Derwish)—a naturalized U.S. citizen who recruited six men from Lackawanna, New York, to briefly attend an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the Lackawanna Six pled guilty to providing material support to al-Qaeda and received sentences ranging from seven to nine years in federal prison.¶ As the Los Angeles Times reported the drone strike: “Even though the CIA wasn’t sure who else was in the car, the customary rules of armed conflict say that anyone sitting next to a legitimate target such as Harithi was, in effect, accepting the risk of imminent death.” (Many international legal scholars would dispute this interpretation.) At the same time, U.S. officials acknowledged that the CIA did not know Hijazi was in the vehicle before the CIA launched the missile, although one later claimed his death was justifiable “collateral damage” since “he was just in the wrong place at the wrong time.”¶ It is plausible that the military-age males who happened to get into al-Harithi’s SUV that day were involved with the suspected al-Qaeda operative in planning terrorist plots. However, there is no way to know this with any certainty, and the Bush administration never presented any supporting evidence to this effect. Moreover, we will never know what specific evidence was used to target al-Harithi, because some of it came from suspected al-Qaeda operative Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri. In 2008, CIA director Hayden testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Nashiri was one of three detainees that the CIA waterboarded, and information obtained by torture is not admissible in a military commission trial.¶ Whether they are called signature strikes, crowd killing, or Terrorist Attack Disruption Strikes, all have been part of U.S. targeted killings from the start, and continue with the CIA’s tactic of staggered drone strikes to kill rescuers of initial victims. The Obama administration makes the false choice that kinetic counterterrorism options are either “large, intrusive military deployments” or drone strikes (although some signature strikes have been conducted with cruise missiles). Or, as former CIA official Henry Crumpton—who, according to his memoir, authorized the first U.S. drone strike on October 20, 2001, in Afghanistan—crudely described the dichotomy: “Look at the firebombing of Dresden, and compare what we’re doing today.” However, people have the right to disagree with the ethical and moral tradeoffs of how drone strikes are currently conducted, and the unwillingness of the Obama administration to discuss them, as well as Congress’ reticence to question them. After ten years of signature strikes, isn’t this a debate worth having?

#### Counter-interp- “targeted killing” is lethal force against those not in custody- broad definitions are comparatively better than scholars like Anderson- it’s most real world for legal practice

**Guardian ’13** [Jan, translator at the International Monetary Fund, Resident Representative Office in Belarus, “TARGETED KILLINGS: A SUMMARY,” <http://acontrarioicl.com/2013/02/27/targeted-killings-a-summary/>]

Currently there is no legal definition of targeted killings in either international or domestic law.[1] ‘Targeted killing’ is rather a descriptive notion frequently used by international actors in order to refer to a specific action undertaken in respect to certain individuals.¶ Various scholars propose different definitions. Machon, for example, refers to ‘targeted killing’ as an “intentional slaying of a specific individual or group of individuals undertaken with explicit governmental approval,”[2] whereas Solis suggests that for there to be a targeted killing (i) there must be an armed conflict, either international or non-international in character; (ii) the victim must be specifically targeted; (iii) he must be beyond a reasonable possibility of arrest; (iv) the killing must be authorized by senior military commanders or the head of government; (v) and the target must be either a combatant or someone directly participating in the hostilities.[3] But whereas some scholars seek to use a human rights-based definition, [4] others propose those which do not entail the applicability of international humanitarian law. [5]¶ However, such definitions are incorrect for several reasons. First of all, the definition of a ‘targeted killing’ has to be broad enough as to cover a wide range of practices and flexible enough as to encompass situations within and outside the scope of an armed conflict, thus, being subject to the application of both international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as opposed to the definition provided by some scholars and even states themselves.[6] Secondly, one should bear in mind that defining an act as an instance of ‘targeted killing’ should not automatically render the illegality of such an act at stake.[7] Moreover, the definition also has to cover situations where such an act is carried out by other subjects of international law, rather than only by states.¶ Therefore, maintaining an element-based approach and synthesizing common characteristics of multiple definitions, it is more advisable to use the one employed by Alston and Melzer, which refers to targeted killings as a use of lethal force by a subject of international law (encompassing non-state actors) that is directed against an individually selected person who is not in custody and that is intentional (rather than negligent or reckless), premeditated (rather than merely voluntary), and deliberate (meaning that ‘the death of the targeted person [is] the actual aim of the operation, as opposed to deprivations of life which, although intentional and premeditated, remain the incidental result of an operation pursuing other aims).[8]

#### They limit the heart of the topic- most strikes are signature-based, and they only allow bad drones affs that don’t solve

**VanValkenberg 3-2**-13 [Noah VanValkenberg, Contributing Writer for Outside Colby, a non-partisan political publication, “Making Drones More Effective: Refining a Necessary Practice in Warfare,” <http://outsidecolby.com/2013/03/making-drones-more-effective-refining-a-necessary-practice-in-warfare/>]

Drones are a crucial piece of the United States’ global war on terror. They have eliminated dangerous individuals such as Anwar al-Awlaki and other senior members of Al Qaeda. However, there is a significant difference between targeted strikes and “signature strikes”—and the use of the latter is only serving to endanger US security.¶ In a typical targeted strike, high-level terrorists are profiled and their names are passed up the chain of command. The National Security Adviser, in conjunction with the Director of Central Intelligence (CIA), will recommend individuals on this “kill list” to President Obama. Ultimately, the President makes the call of who to strike. This is the way drone strikes should work: a missile is only fired after careful analysis and evaluation by experts, and a decision by the President.¶ Signature strikes work entirely differently. Armed drones often loiter over a specific area with no specific mission. If they see a group of individuals acting suspiciously, a relatively low-level intelligence officer can make the call to shoot. The definition of “acting suspiciously” is particularly problematic, as a man carrying a rifle and riding in a pickup truck in the desert may meet that standard. Signature strikes have killed prominent pro-US Yemeni leaders, as documented in the New York Times, they have stoked significant anti-American sentiment, and they have killed 176 children in Northern Pakistan alone.¶ Currently, signature strikes make up the majority of drone attacks, and the targets’ identities are rarely conclusively known. According to an article published in the Journal of International Criminal Justice by Jens Ohlin, only eight percent of suspected militants killed in signature strikes between 2008 and 2010 were mid- to high-level targets. The rest posed no threat to US national security and the strikes incurred enormous collateral damage.¶ However, that collateral damage is enormous. According to the widely cited study Living Under Drones, published by Stanford and NYU, one signature strike alone killed forty members of a peaceful meeting of tribal elders in Northwest Pakistan. The same study argues that many individuals now refrain from going to funerals, because they are so frequently targeted by signature strikes.

### 1AR Cards

#### This is Obama’s definition- that’s key because it’s how the subject of the res defines it

**Sledge ‘13** [Matt Sledge Huffington Post staff writer, “Drone 'Signature Strike' Witness Responds To Obama Speech: 'I Don't Trust A Single Word,'” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/19/drone-signature-strike\_n\_3421586.html]

Such so-called "signature strikes" are one of the most controversial practices in the drone war. When first elected, President Barack Obama was highly skeptical of such attacks, begun under former President George W. Bush in 2008. With time in the Oval Office and advice from military leaders, however, Obama came to accept their use as a vital part of the fight against terrorism.¶ Those signature strikes and their anonymous victims fall under Obama's definition of targeted killings. Unnamed U.S. officials have told The New York Times the signature strikes will continue in Pakistan. In a major national security speech in May, Obama acknowledged that drones sometimes make mistakes, but said their work must carry on.

#### Targeted killings have changed- signature strikes are central

**Benjamin 5-25**-13 [Medea Benjamin, an anti-war activist who helped found Code pink, a women’s group that campaigns against US wars and occupations, “FROM THE BOOKSHELF: Drone Warfare: Killing By Remote Control,” <http://news.sudanvisiondaily.com/details.html?rsnpid=222919>]

Medea Benjamin is an anti-war activist who helped found Code pink, a women’s group that campaigns against US wars and occupations. It is a measure of just how far the Obama administration’s use of targeted killings has expanded from its original premise of going after al-Qaeda ringleaders that Benjamin’s book succeeds in landing a fair few of its intended blows.¶ Drone Warfare lacks the excoriating reporting that distinguishes two books on targeted killings recently published in the US. Jeremy Scahill’s Dirty Wars is particularly strong on the use of drones in Yemen; and Mark Mazzetti’s The Way of the Knife chronicles the way the Central Intelligence Agency has become so heavily involved in military operations in the past decade.¶ But the book does marshal its two main arguments well – arguments with which the political debate is only beginning to grapple. The first is the way the development of these high-tech weapons, which do not require soldiers to be put directly at risk, can subtly lower the barriers to becoming involved in new conflicts. “While drones make it easier to kill some bad guys, they also make it easier to go to war,” as Benjamin puts it.¶ The book is also good on the way the demands of counterterrorist killings have driven US policy in places such as Pakistan – where it was opposed by the leading candidates in the recent parliamentary elections – to the extent that the state department has not only been sidelined, but its capacity to conduct diplomacy compromised.¶ Yet while the extensive use of drone strikes is gathering more attention, the curious feature of the political debate is the way that it sidesteps the most troubling aspect of the targeted killing programme – the “signature strikes”. The drones’ targets are sometimes known terrorist ringleaders. But they can also be based on less exact intelligence – usually young men toting heavy weapons in areas of Pakistan known to be controlled by militants.¶ Although this type of strike has been the most controversial within the administration, it is not at the center of the political discussion. When Mr. Paul sought to use drones to make a case against indiscriminate state power, he chose the theoretical issue of whether drones might ever be used against alleged terrorists in the US. Benjamin breezes quickly over the issue. ¶ In a country still traumatized in many ways by the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, an administration will face little political opposition to the idea that it has the right to go after known al-Qaeda ringleaders. But the prospect that it is possible to select unidentified individuals to be killed on the basis of suspicious behavior alone is a very different proposition altogether.¶ Of all the many legal, moral and political issues thrown up by the extensive use of drone strikes, the biggest objection to the Obama administration’s “targeted killings” is that they are not nearly targeted enough.

#### And, that neg Anderson is AFF ev---- it concedes that we should adopt changing definitions- rigid legal analysis is bad

**Anderson ’11** [Kenneth, Professor at Washington College of Law, American University, Hoover Institution visiting fellow, Non-Resident Visiting Fellow at Brookings, “Efficiency in Bello and ad Bellum: Targeted Killing Through Drone Warfare,” online]

Speaking to the broad future of the technology, however, and given the direction of¶ technology and cost, it appears **inevitable that drones will take on many more operational¶ roles over time**, whether in conventional war, special operations, and what has here been¶ called generically “intelligence-driven uses of force.” Drones will likely evolve – as¶ aircraft, as well as in the weapons and sensor systems they bear – into many specialized¶ types. They will get both bigger and smaller than they are now, for example, and they¶ will surely evolve into those specialized for surveillance and those specialized to fire¶ weapons. And they will also surely evolve into those specialized in high-value,¶ “intelligence-driven” targeted killing of individuals and those that are suited to¶ conventional operations. Bearing in mind these increasingly varied uses is essential to understanding, when it comes to targeted killing and/or drone warfare, that **one-size-fitsall¶ legal analysis** is not sufficient.

#### Uniqueness goes our way --- secrecy proves our argument --- Signature strikes are targeted killing

**Suchman ’12** [Lucy, Ph.D., full Professor of Anthropology of Science and Technology in the Department of Sociology at Lancaster University, in the United Kingdom, member of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control, Visiting Senior Research Fellow with the Work, Interaction and Technology Research Group at King's College London, an Adjunct Professor at the University of Technology, Sydney's Interaction Design and Work Practice Laboratory, and currently an Adjunct Professor at the Information Technology University in Copenhagen, Denmark, “The vagaries of ‘precision’ in targeted killing,” <http://icrac.net/2012/06/the-vagaries-of-precision-in-targeted-killing/>]

Particularly in those areas where targeted killings are concentrated, being identified as ‘militant,’ even being armed, does not in itself meet the criterion of posing an imminent threat to the United States. But the U.S. Government has so far **refused to release** either the criteria or the evidentiary bases for its placement of persons on targeted kill lists. This problem is intensified by the administration’s recent endorsement of so-called ‘signature’ targeting, where in place of positive identification of individuals who pose concrete, specific and imminent threat to life (as required by the laws of armed conflict), targeting can be based on patterns of behavior, observed from the air, that correspond with profiles specified as evidence for ‘militancy’. Shahzad Akbar points out that ‘signature’ effectively means profiling, adding that “before they used to arrest and question you, now they just kill you.” The elision of distinctions between being armed and being a ‘terror suspect’ allows wide scope for action, as does the failure to recognize how these ‘targeted’ killings (where we now have to put targeted as well into scare quotes, insofar as we’re coming to recognize the questions and uncertainties that it masks) might themselves be experienced as terror by civilians on the ground. Pakistani journalist Madiha Tahir urges us, in considering who is a ‘militant,’ to ask: how does a person become one? People join ‘militant’ groups largely in relation to internal divisions quite apart from actions aimed at the U.S, but now increasingly also because of U.S. Attacks. “On what grounds,’ she asked ‘does it make sense to terrorize people in order to hunt terrorists?”

#### Be skeptical of their interp since there’s no codified legal definition or etymology- ours is best and assumes US operational meanings

**O’Connell ’12** [Mary Ellen O’Connell, Robert and Marion Short Chair in Law and Research Professor of International Dispute Resolution, Kroc Institute for Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, “The Right to Life in War and Peace,” online]

Unlike torture, “**targeted killing” is not a term defined in international law**, Church teaching, **or Canon Law**. It is a term of recent provenance, developed much like the expression “harsh interrogation” to create an impression of a tough but lawful and moral technique to enhance security. Targeted killing seems to have first been employed as a term to replace “assassination,” although the international law scholar Nehal Bhuta persuasively argues that there is no important distinction in international law between the terms “targeted killing” and “assassination.” Nils Melzer, a long-time legal adviser with the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva, developed a definition of targeted killing for his study of the phenomenon: “The use of lethal force attributable to a subject of international law with the intent, premeditation and deliberation to kill individually selected persons who are not in the physical custody of those targeting them.” Since 2008, the U.S. has “selected” persons not only by name but also based on “patterns of life.” These attacks are being referred to as “signature strikes” because they are not aimed at a named target. And at least since the Obama administration took over the practice, attacks have been launched at groups as well as individuals.

#### Don’t buy their interp- there is no statutory definition, flexible interps are key to real-world education

**Sell ’12** [Daniel, vice chair of the American Bar Association, Section of International Law, Russia/Eurasia Committee, law clerk at Colley Shroyer & Abraham Co., L.P.A., JD from Capital University Law School, Research Assistant at Capital University Law School, won the 2006–2007 Foreign Language and Area Studies Award, “The United States’ Policy of Targeted Killing and the Use of Force: Another Exception to the United Nation’s Use of Force Regime,”

One **overarching problem** that exists when writing on targeted killing is terminology.¶ This is clearly a problem as it is of the utmost important that readers understand what this¶ article aims to determine. Without knowing what targeted killing refers to, readers will¶ naturally be lost.¶ First, as there is no all-encompassing law in the field of international law that speaks¶ to targeted killing16, it is not possible **simply to look to the law for a definition**. Nowhere¶ do laws **specifically deal with how targeted killing** is supposed to be viewed within an¶ international legal framework.17 It is not as simple as saying that torture is outlawed¶ throughout the world.18 Second, “targeted killing” is not the only term used to refer to this conduct.19 For¶ example, numerous other terms are interchangeably used to refer to the conduct of¶ targeted killing.20 Some of these interchangeable phrases include “extrajudicial killings,”¶ “extrajudicial executions,” and “assassinations.”21 However, these terms are not the best¶ definitions for state-sponsored acts of targeted killing.22 Moreover, some have argued that¶ targeted killing has merely become a euphemism for assassination.23 Such claims only¶ serve to cloud further targeted killing’s definition by linking two completely separate¶ terms into one.¶ Thus, it becomes paramount to define “targeted killing” as used in this article so that¶ readers are not led astray. Moreover, it is important to define the term as “targeted¶ killings are no longer novel.”24 It is almost ironic that academics are noting that **targeted¶ killings are no longer novel**, but **a solid definition** of the term is hard to come by. The¶ following sections will first provide a definition of targeted killing. The second section¶ will look at the problem of interchangeable terms, by looking at the term “assassination.”¶ Finally, the last section will look at why targeted killing and interchangeable terms, such¶ as assassination, are in fact different. This will hopefully inform readers as to specifically¶ what conduct is being analyzed in this article.¶ 1. Targeted Killing¶ As mentioned, the main problem in defining targeted killing is that there is no¶ statutory definition of this term.25 Moreover, “[t]here is no generally accepted definition of ‘targeted killing.’”26 Therefore, it is important to look at several of the definitions that¶ do exist in order to determine which definition is best, or create one definition based on¶ the several variants. However, it should be first noted that this term came into common¶ usage in 2000.27 Israel has used this term “to describe one of the means it uses to combat¶ what it labels as terrorist attacks directed against its citizens.”28 This term is useful as it¶ “accurately refers to what the Israelis actually do.”29 This term is also useful for the¶ United States as it certainly explains the policy of the United States government.30¶ Additionally, another issue to consider in defining targeted killing is that the policy is¶ used in various contexts and employs the use of different means and methods.31 As the¶ United Nations has noted, “[t]argeted killings . . . take place in a variety of contexts and¶ may be committed by governments and their agents in times of peace as well as armed¶ conflict, or by organized armed groups in armed conflict.”32 As concerns the methods¶ used, they may “include sniper fire, shooting at close range, missiles from helicopters,¶ gunships, drones, the use of car bombs, and poison.”33

#### “Targeted killings” means killing without judicial review- includes signature strikes

**Wallace ’12** [Bruce, founder of 121Contact.org, a website aimed at preventing and coping with political violence, member of the Steering Committee of September Eleventh Families for Peaceful Tomorrows, “Obama’s Targeted Killing Strategy and Drone Strike Tactics,” Sept. 30, <http://121contact.typepad.com/my_weblog/2012/09/sept-30-2012-obamas-targeted-killing-strategy-and-drone-strike-tactics.html>]

Targeted Killing, a simple definition: attacks on suspected terrorists in other nations without judicial review.¶ The law is murky simply because this is a new enemy, a new international situation, and there is no historical body of law that governs the situation. This is, we know, a bit simplistic and the interpretations of international and domestic law are convoluted and, not surprisingly, quite biased. What is clear is that a) the United States Executive believes it has the right to identify and kill non-state actors who are actively engaged in attacking U.S. lives, material, and interests, or those who are aiding such people or activities, b) the Congress has expended little energy in investigating and/or challenging these beliefs, and c) the Supreme Court has shown little interest in oversight of decisions made by the Executive in these matters.¶ It’s not new to have the Executive make such decisions. We have been using targeting killing since the American Revolution when British officers became prime targets, to the dismay of the British who thought this activity well beyond acceptable behavior. The first example: Colonel Daniel Morgan's rifle corps targeting British officers before the Battle of Saratoga. [History.Org]¶ So today we find the intelligence resources, often from computer monitors in the U.S., identifying targets and the executive signing off on attacking them, with President Obama having the final say.¶ What’s right with targeted killing and drone strikes? After having proved the ineffectiveness and extreme costs in lives and material of ‘large footprint’ warfare against terrorists, targeted killing has become the weapon of choice. It is seen as a humane approach, and certainly it is if you compare it to Dresden. The number of innocent civilians killed is smaller that would result from traditional on the ground military operations.¶ There is an unfairness in historical comparisons since the threat, on in current scale, is new, and existing law is murkily applicable at best.¶ Because the administration is loath to be transparent about targeted killing and drone strikes it is hard to gather evidence, but reporters around the world are trying their best. London’s Bureau for Investigative Journalism estimates that as of September 2012 there have been at least 336 drone strikes in Pakistan, another 35-45 recorded in Yemen and up to nine in Somalia. “The data also records the number of deaths, which could be up to 3,247 across the three countries, including up to 852 civilians.” These numbers reflect the administrations counting all who die in the strikes as enemies unless later proven innocent (although few, if any, investigations have been carried out). Looking at the ratio of civilians to combatants it is clear that drone strikes are a relatively humane way to kill enemies. This, of course, assumes that the people designated by the U.S. Executive are, in fact, enemies.¶ The bottom line, from the Obama administration’s point of view: it’s efficient in terms of American lives lost, dollars spent, and hard resources expended. It is relatively humane in terms of the ratio of civilian to combatant deaths.¶ Contrary to popular opinion we see the entire program as problematical in many areas. Our main objection is the lack of oversight before the killings take place, especially in the cases involving signature strikes which are becoming, by far, the most common reason for targeted killings. Signature Strikes are the targeting of groups of men who bear characteristics associated with terrorism, but whose identities aren’t known. They occur when and where the behavior of a group [meeting, marching, and gathering] is used as a pretext for targeting. These determinations are primarily made by operators the U.S. watching their video screens. They do not target specific individuals and are an ominous drift from the justification of “imminent danger.” The resultant targeting of funeral processions, wedding gatherings, etc. highlight the lack of cultural understanding on the part of the operators.¶ The lack of legal review persists after the strikes since most are not investigated after the fact. The loss of the importance of presentation and review of evidence that an individual or group deserves to be killed is a large departure from the rule of law. These are not hot sites where imminent danger to U.S. interests is involved. There is time for review. A relatively new dictate embraced by President Obama states that all military-age males in a strike zone are combatants, unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent. [New York Times] While this makes the counting easy, it is as far from justice as one can get.¶ Further, we are broadening of the definition of ‘imminence’: President Obama's counterterrorism adviser, John Brennan, stated: "We are finding increasing recognition in the international community that a more flexible understanding of "imminence" may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist groups,¶ The real bottom line: Targeted killings are far beyond legal and moral activities. The blatant disregard for review of evidence alone puts them in a special category outside jurisprudence. The immorality of mass killings of people whose ‘behavior is like the behavior of terrorists’ seems obvious to us. The counting of all who die in drone strikes as enemies unless posthumous evidence proves them innocent is an outrageous travesty of the rule of law. The constant hiding of the facts surrounding individual strikes is discordant with the American ideal of transparent government. Targeted killings and the drone strike tactic are anathema and the curse will fall upon United States citizens who are, rightly, seen as complicit in these activities. The form of the curse is already taking shape in the powerful recruiting propaganda that the strikes engender.

#### Our aff is the heart of the topic- most strikes are behavior-based and it’s a key I-law question

**McIrney 4-11**-13 [Peggy, Director of Communications at the UCLA International Institute, citing Kevin Jon Heller, who is Associate Professor & Reader at the Law School of Melbourne University, Australia. A permanent member of the international law blog “Opinio Juris,” he is also Project Director for International Criminal Law at the Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law, a joint project of Melbourne Law School and the Australian Defence Force, “U.S. drone signature strikes: An often illegal “killing machine”,” <http://www.international.ucla.edu/news/article.asp?parentid=131351>]

The United States clearly believes that using lethal force against suspected terrorists is legal, said legal scholar Kevin Jon Heller, as long as it conforms with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter (the right of states to defend themselves against armed attack). Heller spoke at a lecture organized by the UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations and the Sanela Diana Jenkins Human Rights Project of the UCLA School of Law.¶ “Signature strikes,” explained Heller, make up the overwhelming majority of drone attacks carried out by the United States. These strikes target individuals whose identities are unknown, but who exhibit certain patterns of behavior or defining characteristics associated with terrorist activity. In contrast, “personality” strikes target specific, known individuals, such as the strike that killed American-born Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen in October 2011.¶ “It is critically important to understand that an extra-territorial targeted killing potentially violates two different, but equally fundamental, rights under international law,” said Heller. First, it could violate the right of the affected state to territorial sovereignty, as protected under Article 24 of the U.N. Charter. Second, it could violate the targeted individual’s right to life, as protected under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).¶ Even if a U.S. signature strike can be considered a necessary proportionate response to an armed attack, Heller insisted that this did not mean that the use of deadly force against an individual was legal—a distinction the United States does not seem to understand.

#### Signature strikes majority of drone attacks

RT ’13 (“Leaked report: Nearly half of US drone strikes in Pakistan not against al-Qaeda”, <http://rt.com/news/drones-us-al-qaeda-militants-649/>, April 12, 2013)

A trove of leaked classified reports has confirmed what many had suspected – US drone kills in Pakistan are not the precision strikes against top-level al-Qaeda terrorists they are portrayed as by the Obama administration. Instead, many of the attacks are aimed at suspected low-level tribal militants, who may pose no direct danger to the United States – and for many there appears to be little evidence to justify the assassinations. Top secret documents obtained by McClatchy newspapers in the US show the locations, identities and numbers of those attacked and killed in Pakistan in 2006-8 and 2010-11, as well as explanations for why the targets were picked. The statistics illustrate the breadth of the US ‘drone doctrine’ – which has never been defined by consecutive US administrations. Between 1,990 and 3,308 people are reported to have been killed in the drone strikes in Pakistan since 2004, the vast majority of them during the Obama terms. In the 12-month period up to 2011, 43 out of 95 drone strikes in the reports (which give an account of the vast majority of US operations in the country) were not aimed at al-Qaeda at all. And 265 out of 482 people killed in those assassinations, were defined internally as “extremists”. Indeed, only six of the men killed – less than two percent – were senior al-Qaeda leaders. Some of the groups include the Haqqani network and the Taliban Movement of Pakistan, both militant organizations, but ones the US did not designate as terrorists until 2012 and 2010 respectively. Neither one has ever conducted an attack on US soil. It also confirms that attacks during the George W. Bush era, were conducted on targets picked by ISI, Pakistan’s security agency, which has no obligations to comply with US legal criteria. Furthermore, in some cases it is difficult to confirm that the targets were militants at all. In the strikes above, the internal reports showed that only one civilian had been killed. But the modus operandi revealed behind the strikes, shows that some of the attacks seem to have been based on the certain people or visitors being present as certain locations, or merely associating with those the US believes were terrorists. This chimes with the accusation that the US is carrying out a policy of “signature strikes” – attacks based on behavior, or “signature” that would be expected of a terrorist, rather than any specific illegal activity. These “signatures” apparently include such suspicious behavior as taking part in a funeral procession or first responding to an initial drone strike. Last year, the United Nation’s special rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, Ben Emmerson, said it’s believed that, “since President Obama took office, at least 50 civilians were killed in follow-up strikes when they had gone to help victims and more than 20 civilians have also been attacked in deliberate strikes on funerals and mourners.” The US has previously refused to admit that it operates such a policy. Some of the assassinations, such as that of, Mohammad, the younger brother of the leader of the Haqqani network, Badruddin, appear to have been simply errors, with the victims branded as terrorists only after the fact. All this seems to go against the assurance of John Brennan, the former White House counterterrorism chief, and new CIA head, who is the mastermind behind the drone policy “We only authorize a particular operation against a specific individual if we have a high degree of confidence that the individual being targeted is indeed the terrorist we are pursuing,” Brennan explained a year ago. Obama’s administration has also said all targets are on a “list of active terrorists,” compiled with “extraordinary care and thoughtfulness”. Obama has also explicitly stated that drones should not carry out “speculative” killings. But other than when ordering assassinations of US citizens, the President does not have to give full information to the Senate about the basis for any drone attack, much less give it a legal justification. The latest revelations have unleashed a torrent of protest from experts who believe that the program is extra-judicial, violates Pakistan’s sovereignty, and is counter-productive in the long term. “I have never seen nor am I aware of any rules of engagement that have been made public that govern the conduct of drone operations in Pakistan, or the identification of individuals and groups other than al Qaida and the Afghan Taliban,” Christopher Swift, a national security law expert from Georgetown University told McClatchy. “We are doing this on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis, rather than a systematic or strategic basis.” Micah Zenko, from the Council on Foreign Relations, a foreign policy think tank, went further, and accused the government of “misleading the public about the scope of who can legitimately be targeted.” He added: “When there is such a disconnect between who the administration says it kills and who it actually kills, that hypocrisy itself is a very dangerous precedent that other countries will emulate.” Last month Ben Emmerson, after a secret research trip to the country announced that drone strikes violate Pakistan's sovereignty. Emmerson added that the Pakistani government conveyed to him that it does not consent to the attacks, something that is often challenged in Washington and fuels mass protests in Pakistan. Drone strikes were first used after the 9/11 attacks from bases in Pakistan and Uzbekistan, in combat missions inside Afghanistan. More than a decade later, Washington has expanded the use of the remotely controlled aircraft into Yemen, Somalia and most of all Pakistan. The US has carried out countless attacks on targets in northwest Pakistan since 2004 through the CIA’s Special Activities Division. Begun by President George W. Bush, the intensity of the missions has increased under the presidency of Barack Obama. Islamabad publicly condemns these attacks but is known to have shared intelligence with the US and allowed drones to operate from its territory until April 2011, when NATO forces killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in the Salala incident. WikiLeaks cables also revealed that Pakistan's Army Chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani sanctioned the flights and in 2008 even asked the CIA for more “Predator coverage.” Ordinary Pakistanis have also repeatedly protested against these attacks as a violation of its sovereignty and because of immense civilian collateral damage, including the death dozens of women and children.

## Case

### 2AC- AT: Alternative Worse

#### Drones incentivize alternative forms

Dowd ’13 (Alan Dowd, Writes on national defense, foreign policy, and international security. His writing has appeared in multiple publications including Parameters, Policy Review, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, World Politics Review, American Outlook, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Times, The National Post, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, and The Financial Times Deutschland. He holds a B.A. with high honors from Butler University and an M.A. from Indiana University, “Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings”, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Issues/WinterSpring_2013/1_Article_Dowd.pdf>, Winter/Spring 2013)

As Michael Ignatieff asked in 2000, years before the drone war began, “If war becomes unreal to the citizens of modern democracies, will they care enough to restrain and control the violence exercised in their name . . . if they and their sons and daughters are spared the hazards of combat?”29 That question is directly linked to policymakers in the drone age. The risks policymakers take with UCAVs are greater because the accountability is less than with manned aircraft. After all, the loss of a drone is the loss of nothing more than metal. “More willing to lose is more willing to use,” as Daniel Haulman of the Air Force Historical Research Agency puts it.30 Yet as America’s deepening involvement in Yemen underscores, drones may actually make boots on-the-ground intervention more likely. To identify new targets and authenticate existing targets for the drone war, Washington has quietly sent US troops into Yemen. According to unnamed military officials, the contingent of American troops is growing.31 As the troops identify targets, they become targets. Thus, far from preventing more direct and riskier forms of military engagement, drones are encouraging such engagement—even as many of their operators paradoxically carry out their lethal missions from the safety of bases in Nevada or New Mexico.

## Kritik

### Sanitization

#### Framework-

#### Extinction first – VTL inevitable

Bernstein ‘2 (Richard J., Vera List Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research, “Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation”, p. 188-192)

There is a basic value inherent inorganic being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life" (IR 81). 15 "The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being" (IR 81-2). Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power. But precisely this transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics. Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human action so radically that the underlying premises of traditional ethics are no longer valid. For the first time in history human beings possess the knowledge and the power to destroy life on this planet, including human life. Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for life. The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." We need, Jonas argued, a new categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; or expressed negatively: "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"; or simply: "Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth"; or again turned positive: "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will."

#### Their impact is wrong – debate over even the most technical issues improves decision-making and advocacy

Ben- Naftali ‘3 (Orna Ben-Naftali, Head of the International Law Division and of the Law and Culture Division, The Law School, The College of Management Academic Studies, Spring 2003, ARTICLE: 'We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law': A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 Cornell Int'l L.J. 233)

Our analysis concludes that while a specific act of preemptive killing may be legal if it meets the above-specified requirements, the policy of state targeted preemptive killings is not. Furthermore, some specific acts of targeted killings may generate state responsibility, while others may constitute a war crime entailing criminal accountability. These conclusions, emanating from the reading of the three legal texts applicable to the context, and informed by a sensibility that coheres them, do not rest on a negation of the importance of the national interest in security. On the contrary, these conclusions incorporate and express the way it should be balanced with a minimum standard of humanity and against the relevant context. This delicate, ever precarious balance is at the heart of the democratic discourse. A democratic state is not a meek state. True, it is fighting with "one hand tied behind its back,"n342 as soberly observed by Chief Justice Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court, but democratic sensibilities internalize this limitation on State power, not as a source of weakness but as a sign of strength. Democracies require a public discourse forever alert to the importance of human rights, suspicious of the way power is used, and committed to the rule of law. The legal culture, in turn, while not a substitute for this public discourse, is never absent from it and indeed serves as a catalyst for its development. We therefore reject the notion that the policy of targeted killings, designed by Israel as a way to combat terrorist attacks, is beyond the purview of the rule of law.n343 We also deny the purist position suggesting that the legalistic nitty-gritty preoccupation with details entailed in the above discussion is likely to obscure and legitimize a harrowing policy; n344 one that, on principle, should be condemned. n345 This position in fact maintains that the legality or illegality of targeted state killings is not a legitimate issue of discussion; that while an emergency situation may exceptionally necessitate the deed, it should never be elevated to the sphere of the Word. n346 We appreciate the sensibility of this position, but, alas, do not find it sensible. Indeed, nor would the people who consider themselves victims of the policy of targeted killings, and appeal to the courts to intervene. n347 Purity belongs to the Platonic world of ideas; it is a necessary ideal to strive for, even if forever unachievable in this all too fallible City of Man. n348 In the best of all possible worlds law would be superfluous; in this world, it is a necessary, albeit insufficient means to achieve some possible betterment. This article hopes to contribute to this modest goal.

#### Cede the political

Krouzman ‘5 (Roni, Founding Director of Next Generation, “Fill the Vacuum,” February 21, http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0221-21.htm)

By the 1930s, both the Left and the Right in Spain had lost faith in the national government. The Left saw it as an oppressive capitalist force, and the Right saw it as too liberal and permissive. Today, the United States stands at a similar crossroads: the Left is becoming increasingly disgusted with politics and the political system - especially after the last two elections - and an increasingly authoritarian Right is taking over. And it is taking over almost everywhere, from the presidency, the federal legislature, our national court system and our major national political parties, down to my local school board, which is appointing conservative, authoritarian school administrators in one of the most liberal parts of the country. God only knows what is happening in Kansas and Alabama. On the Left, we are beginning to panic, because we all understand - deep to the very core of our beings - that to travel down the tragic road that Spain and Germany and Italy did during the first half of the last century - at a time when our government possesses unparalleled powersto persecute domestic dissidents and, along with an expanding array of other countries, a stockpile of nuclear weapons with the capacity to destroy the world many times over - would lead to a disaster unprecedented in human history, one that may end life on Earth as we know it. If we are to avert such a disaster, we must draw our inspiration from the past, by looking to popular movements that succeeded in achieving peace and justice without resorting to violence. Thankfully, there were many that did so, and they left many valuable lessons. Yet if we are to succeed, we must also do some things differently. We must learn from those popular movements that failed, namely those that abandoned **their** nationalgovernments, because they hold profound lessons as well. In most countries, the Right stands on many legs, and that makes it seem powerful. But that unity is invariably built upon many contradictions, and each of those legs embodies at least one vulnerable Achilles' heel. Today, one of the Right's most glaring Achilles' heels is the fact that at the same time it is dismantling much of our government in both word and deed, it also depends on government power to maintain foreign and domestic control. And here-in lies an extraordinary opportunity, if we are willing to let go of past labels and broaden our worldview. The Right is going for broke, gambling that it can dismantle much of the State apparatus and still maintain support and control. Today, the Left has the once in a few decades opportunity to call the Right's bluff, to build a popular movement that will not only stop the Right in its tracks but use its energy to move us closer to the peaceful, just, sustainable society we all dream of quicker than we ever thought imaginable. To call that bluff, we can do one simple thing: as citizens, we can fill the vacuum. And there is no better time to start than now, several months after the Presidential election, at a time when the Right is making clear its foreign and domestic priorities for the years to come and the Left is grappling for new strategies. As spring approaches, we have fertile ground in which to plant our seeds. In my town of San Rafael - as in the majority of municipalities across the country - the Right's retreat at the national level is causing growing hardship locally. Though San Rafael is located in the wealthiest county in California, our library has shortened its hours and slashed its budget for new books. The schools here are laying-off teachers. The roads are not being as well maintained and the cultural programs are disappearing. As progressives, we are always torn between wanting to build something beautiful but also knowing we must stop what is ugly. This dilemma amounts to a heart-wrenching Catch-22: How can we promote justice and sustainability when we need to stop war and destruction? And yet how can we stop war and destruction without building justice and sustainability? Today, we can do both: we can build while we oppose. We can use the Right's energy to our advantage, and as it comes charging toward us, shift our stance a bit and flip those forces over onto their backs, where they can lay in a daze and watch as we build a new society. This may sound like a grand vision, and in some ways it is. But mostly it's quite simple: As the Right abandons the State, we can rush in to fill the void. As the Right cuts funding for our schools, we can step in and not only support our public schools, but create out of their shells the progressive, nurturing institutions they can and ought to be. As the Right cuts funding for health care, we can take over our local public hospitals and expand their missions. As the Right cuts funding for our cultural institutions, we can rush in to support those institutions and use our newfound power to make their mandates more progressive than they've ever been. And even when it comes to the police, when the Right cuts funding for cops, we may choose to rush in and use our newfound power to create more community policing positions, and enact stronger guidelines to protect our freedoms and our bodies from police abuse. Sometimes, taking over our local institutions will come only after difficult struggles. Other times we will face virtually no resistance. In any case, we can count on a basic tenant of human organization that holds true from the most liberal democracies to the most authoritarian dictatorships: whether crafting economic policies or putting in new speed bumps, the world is run by those who show up. Across America, the Right is showing up. From national elections to local school boards, the conservative base is taking over our democratic institutions and altering the very nature of our country. Today, the Left must do the same. We cannot afford to make the mistakes our predecessors made in much of Europe during the 1920s and 30s. Instead, we must show up. And as we do so, we can use our newfound power not only to stop the Right and take back our country and our communities, but to demand that our institutions become more just and sustainable as well. We can demand that all police uniforms issued by the police department we now control - with a new mandate and more progressive practices - be made of organic cotton in fair trade factories that minimize pollution. We can demand that all our schools conserve energy and run on solar power and provide their students with healthy food and pay their cafeteria workers a living wage. The same holds true for our political freedoms and institutions. If the Right is intent on destroying the Bill of Rights, let us embrace its valuable protections - to freedom of expression, and due process, and liberty from unwarranted search and seizure - and educate our fellow citizens about why they are important, and even seek to strengthen the protections they provide and apply them to new realms, throughout every government agency and even throughout the private sector. As the Democratic Party loses power, let us do what my friend Janis and her friends did, and what Michael Moore has begged us to do for years: let us take over its local committees and make the Democrats into a true People's Party. Such action will require a major shift in our worldview, from looking at government and dominant institutions as the enemy to looking at "them" as ours. And people in my town, especially young people, are beginning to make that shift. In two weeks, high school students will join forces with elected officials and workers in our community - with teachers and librarians and police and firefighters - for a rally and march through town to demand funding for our communities instead of for war. We must stand up against the authoritarian Right government to ensure sustainability and become the true patriots. We are filling the void the Right has created, and we will march to OUR police station, our local school, our park, our library, and our town hall. We will oppose and resist the policies of the Right at the same time that we march hand in hand with a growing, grassroots coalition of citizens that will rebuild and reshape our community. The shift in worldview such actions require will truly take hold when we begin to reconnect with our country and look at ourselves as patriots once again. Because most of us know, whether we are on the Left or on the Right or in the middle, that patriotism does not mean obeying the government. It means supporting and doing what is right for our community and our nation. In an increasingly interdependent world where we are the undisputed superpower, doing what is truly right for America - ensuring she interacts sustainably with the environment, ensuring she respects the rights, freedoms and well being of her citizens, ensuring she acts with good will towards other nations - will invariably help not just America, but everyone and every nation on the planet. Today, being a true patriot goes hand in hand with being a global citizen, one who cares about freedom and justice and equality. For too long, the Right has been allowed to define patriotism, and has taught us all to believe that the generals and the presidents and the religious extremists of this country are the true patriots. And if its definition were really true, I would want little to do with patriotism. But that is not the case, and it never has been. The true patriots have not been the presidents, they have been the Freedom Riders and the Suffragettes and the Abolitionists and the labor organizers who forced those presidents to do what was right. The true patriots have not been the generals. They have been the pacifists and the tax resisters and the peace activists and the conscientious objectors who have kept them from destroying the planet. The true patriots have not been and never will be the religious extremists. They are us. They are the people who work at the non-profits and care for the elderly and stand with the poor and teach the sick and make our buildings more environmentally friendly and farm our land organically and preserve our glorious open spaces. Given the many wrongs our government has perpetrated, such a shift in consciousness can be difficult. Yet I am coming to believe we cannot win this great struggle if we do not have faith in and love for our towns and our people and our country. If we lack that faith and that love, we will forever think of ourselves as the minority in an alien land, and we will forever be locked in a negative cycle of cynicism, protest and disillusionment. Only it might not be forever because we may soon lose the physical, ecological and political security to even express dissenting views, much less hold them. If, on the other hand, we begin to feel pride in our people and our communities and our country - if we are honest about the bad as well as all the good - we cannot only reclaim the idea of America, we can tap our creative power to apply its virtues wholeheartedly today - especially at the local level - and even take her and thus the planet a massive leap forward. In Spain, and in other countries across Europe, it was the Left's retreat from government that at least in part accelerated the Right's ascension to power, yielding disastrous consequences for the home country and, eventually, much of the planet. Today, we find ourselves in a similar position. The Spanish freedom fighters proclaimed that they would rather die on their feet than live on their knees. I would rather live on my feet, in a country I can truly be proud of. I believe we can build that country - and avert disaster - if we fill the vacuum the Right has created, and exploit its massive gamble to our advantage. We can view our current crisis as an exciting opportunity to develop unprecedented coalitions that take over our civic institutions and mold them, and hence our entire nation, into the just, peaceful, and sustainable society we so desperately need and want to create. By filling the void the Right has created, we can stop the tide of fear and oppression that is engulfing our country, and build something unbelievably beautiful in its place.

#### The alt doesn’t influence legal decisionmaking and results in tyranny

Paul **Passavant**, Ph.D., Hobart and William Smith College Associate Professor of Political Science, December 20**10**, Yoo's Law, Sovereignty, and Whatever, Constellations Volume 17, Issue 4, pages 549–571

For some on the left, it has become conventional to celebrate, if not cultivate, pluralism, whether this means multiple forms of being or multiple interpretive possibilities with regard to texts. It has also become conventional to be critical of “sovereignty” and of “law.” Multiplicity is thought to be a threat to sovereignty, and this threat is thought to be democratizing or a force that resists oppression. The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben exemplifies these tendencies within contemporary political and legal theory. In some of his earlier and less well-known work, he aspires toward a “coming community” that he calls “whatever being.” Whatever being embraces the infinite communicative possibilities of language as pure means beyond a preoccupation with true or false propositions. In his best-known work, Agamben links sovereignty to the production of rightless subjects and the Nazi death camps. He urges us to rethink the very ontological basis of politics in the West, creating a human being beyond sovereignty or law, in order to avoid perilous outcomes. One key to surpassing the logic of sovereignty, according to Agamben, is whatever being's positive relation to the singularities of life and the multiplicities of communication. Whatever being is also being outside of law. If “law” persists in this “coming community,” it would be a “law” that has become deactivated and deposed from its prior purposes. “Law” will have become an object for play – something to be toyed with the way that children might come upon a disused object and play with it by putting it to uses disconnected from whatever purpose this object might once have had. Why does the fact of playful communicative possibilities lead to either more democracy or a less brutal world? The most conservative United States Supreme Court justices have recently embraced the fact that texts are open to multiple interpretations. For example, Samuel Alito has suggested that the meaning of public monuments is open to multiple interpretations that may shift over time to avoid a potential First Amendment establishment clause problem over a monument of the Ten Commandments in a public park.1 Yet, as the late Justice Blackmun has written regarding state endorsement of religion, “government cannot be premised on the belief that all persons are created equal when it asserts that God prefers some.”2 Recognizing the possibility of multiple interpretations, as this instance shows, does not lead necessarily to outcomes friendly to democracy. In this essay, I investigate how playing with the multiplicity of communicative possibilities can, **contrary to Agamben's expectations**, actually **facilitate aspirations for unitary sovereign power**. My argument unfolds in the context of the legal arguments put forward by Bush administration lawyer John Yoo, particularly those enabling torturous interrogations. Those, like Agamben, who favor interpretive pluralism in itself rarely, if ever, have right-wing supporters of unchecked presidentialism in mind. Reading the scholarship and legal memoranda of John Yoo, formerly in the Bush administration's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and presently a University of California, Berkeley law professor, however, approaches an experience of pure mediality or of law that has become deposed or disconnected from its purposes. Yoo is well known as the author of the key legal memoranda asserting the president's discretionary power to make war, to engage in warrantless surveillance, and, most infamously, justifying torturous methods of interrogation. Some scholars refer to Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland to describe the experience of reading Yoo's legal memos.3 Is **John Yoo an exemplar of the whatever being** and pure mediality that Agamben describes and to which he contends politics should aspire? In this paper, I describe how Yoo gestures toward pure mediality, as he indicates the experience of language itself as pure communicability or as pure means in his legal work when he emphasizes the openness of law to being exposed to new, different, flexible, or plural interpretive possibilities. I argue, however, that Yoo is not well described as whatever being. His work repeats too consistently in the direction of absolute presidential decisionism to be open to whatever. Instead, Yoo's work may capture a broader development within our society that Agamben describes as the emergence of whatever being. Without saying that there has been no resistance to the Bush administration's warrantless wiretapping and policies of torturous interrogations, the contrast between the response to the Nixon administration and the Bush administration is striking. Richard Nixon resigned one step ahead of impeachment in the midst of mass protests against his presidency. The articles of impeachment, for instance, addressed how Nixon engaged in warrantless wiretapping, and refused to execute laws passed by Congress faithfully while repeatedly engaging in conduct that violated the constitutional rights of citizens. Congress also passed major acts of legislation to prevent a president such as Nixon from ever again abusing power the way he had. These laws include the War Powers Act of 1973, the Budget Impoundment and Control Act of 1974, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. In contrast, almost no one seems to have noticed that the Bush administration claimed power to make war at the president's sole discretion. Additionally, upon learning that the Bush administration engaged in criminal acts of surveillance, Congress amended FISA in the summer of 2008 to expand the government's power to spy on Americans, while immunizing from legal accountability non-state actors who collaborated with the then-criminal acts of government officials who followed Bush's illegal orders. Congress tried to make it impossible for those detained to question, legally, their detention or to bring the torturous treatment they endured to a court's attention, while allowing the intelligence agencies to continue to engage in torturous acts by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). This complicity on the part of Congress cannot be explained on partisan grounds as many Democrats voted in favor of the MCA, and upon becoming the majority party in Congress, they have not rescinded it. Indeed, it was a Democratic-controlled Congress that brushed the Bush administration's illegal surveillance under the rug in 2008.4 Moreover, upon taking power in 2006, the Democratic leadership immediately stated that they would not pursue impeachment. Former Reagan administration Department of Justice lawyer Bruce Fein has decried the lack of outrage at the Bush administration's illegalities by suggesting that the nation has become a collection of constitutional “illiterates.”5 **Perhaps law is being deposed as Agamben suggests**. Both Agamben's and Fein's observations may also indicate a failure of what Michel Foucault would call disciplinary power – the power to constitute subjects capable of exercising power, here the powers of liberal democracy – a failure that Gilles Deleuze has identified with the emergence of societies of control, and a subjective and ontological diversity that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri call the “multitude.”6 They also indicate practices of textual “interpretation” where interpretative acts extricate legal texts from the narratives that once oriented their purposes and animated these texts for a republican and anti-monarchical polity. Robert Cover argues, however, that law is part of a narrative practice constitutive of subjects and a way of life.7 Insofar as interpretive practices become extricated from the possibility of narrative, then, we may indeed doubt the continuing existence of “law,” as Agamben posits. Psychoanalytic theory also identifies a loss of a structuring meaning in contemporary society and describes this as the decline of symbolic efficiency.8 In sum, there appears to be a phenomenon emerging in contemporary society that a variety of different theoretical and political perspectives are struggling to grasp and evaluate. While Agamben welcomes the failures of disciplinary powers as enabling the emergence of whatever being and the “coming community,” it is a cause for concern among those seeking to keep the faith with republicanism, with liberal democracy, or with a Constitution representing these aspirations. In this light, we can be more specific than Agamben about the kind of threat that whatever being poses to the state or to sovereignty. Contrary to Agamben's contentions, I find that whatever being is no threat at all to the kind of unitary sovereignty that Agamben uses to theorize the state in his book Homo Sacer. Why would it be? Whatever being would be equally at ease with the legal justifications on behalf of a “unitary” sovereignty as it would anything else. If we, however, give the achievements of the people their due and consider the question of sovereignty from the perspective of popular sovereignty, of the assemblies and assemblages of power through which liberal democratic states seek to extend themselves and to govern at a distance, then whatever being is very much a danger to this type of power. Whatever being can be understood as facilitating a process of deposing this law and this state. A relation of whatever to the installation of a state of unchecked presidential powers and torture can be the **death knell of popular sovereignty** dedicated to the purpose of opposing tyranny. Whatever being is not the enemy of any state or form of “sovereignty.” It is the enemy of popular sovereignty. Whatever ruins democracy. **If we want more than unchecked presidential power and torture, then we will have to dedicate ourselves to certain purposes**, like resisting tyranny and recalling that this was the purpose of the U.S. Constitution.

### Security

#### Extinction first – VTL inevitable

Bernstein ‘2 (Richard J., Vera List Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research, “Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation”, p. 188-192)

There is a basic value inherent inorganic being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life" (IR 81). 15 "The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being" (IR 81-2). Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power. But precisely this transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics. Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human action so radically that the underlying premises of traditional ethics are no longer valid. For the first time in history human beings possess the knowledge and the power to destroy life on this planet, including human life. Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for life. The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." We need, Jonas argued, a new categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; or expressed negatively: "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"; or simply: "Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth"; or again turned positive: "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will."

#### The alt fails and threats should be evaluated in specific context to reduce likelihood of conflict – the alt will result in escalation of violence

Weaver 2k (Ole, International relations theory and the politics of European integration, pages 284-285)

The other main possibility is to stress' responsibility. Particularly in a field like security one has to make choices and deal with the challenges and risks that one confronts – and not shy away into long-range or principled trans-formations. The meta political line risks (despite the theoretical commitment to the concrete other) implying that politics can be contained within large 'systemic questions. In line with he classical revolutionary tradition, after the change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical trans-formation), there will be no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change) we should not deal with the 'small questions' of politics, only with the large one (cf. Rorty 1996). However, the ethical demand in post-structuralism (e.g. Derrida's 'justice') is of a kind that can never be instantiated in any concrete political order – It is an experience of the undecidable that exceeds any concrete solution and reinserts politics. Therefore, politics can never be reduced to meta-questions there is no way to erase the small, particular, banal conflicts and controversies. In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the 'opening' oriented version of deconstruction, we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. To take a position, take part, and 'produce events' (Derrida 1994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place 'in the singular event of engagement' (Derrida 1996: 83). Derrida's politics is focused on the calls that demand response/responsibility contained in words like justice, Europe and emancipation. Should we treat security in this manner? No, security is not that kind of call. 'Security' is not a way to open (or keep open) an ethical horizon. Security is a much more situational concept oriented to the handling of specifics. It belongs to the sphere of how to handle challenges – and avoid 'the worst' (Derrida 1991). Here enters again the possible pessimism which for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. The infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature of politics (Morgenthau 1946, Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some 'good deed', 'I have assumed my responsibilities ' (Derrida 1996: 86). If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility; otherwise there would he no ethical problems or decisions. (ibid.; and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau 1946; Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this there will remain conflicts and risks - and the question of how to handle them. Should developments be securitized (and if so, in what terms)? Often, our reply will be to aim for de-securitization and then politics meet meta-politics; but occasionally the underlying pessimism regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility among human aspirations will point to scenarios sufficiently worrisome that responsibility will entail securitization in order to block the worst. As a security/securitization analyst, this means accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns, to try to assist in shaping the continent in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence - even if this occasionally means invoking/producing `structures' or even using the dubious instrument of securitization. In the case of the current European configuration, the above analysis suggests the use of securitization at the level of European scenarios with the aim of preempting and avoiding numerous instances of local securitization that could lead to security dilemmas and escalations, violence and mutual vilification.

A stable system of deterrence prevents nuclear war – it create a stable ontological context for interaction and expectations

Lupovici 8 (Amir, Post-Doctoral Fellow Munk Centre for International Studies, Why the Cold War Practices of Deterrence are Still Prevalent: Physical Security, Ontological Security and Strategic Discourse, [http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/ papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf](http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Lupovici.pdf), AD: 9/22/10) jl

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Since deterrence can become part of the actors’ identity, it is also involved in the actors’ will to achieve ontological security, securing the actors’ identity and routines. As McSweeney explains, ontological security is “the acquisition of confidence in the routines of daily life—the essential predictability of interaction through which we feel confident in knowing what is going on and that we have the practical skill to go on in this context.” These routines become part of the social structure that enables and constrains the actors’ possibilities (McSweeney, 1999: 50-1, 154-5; Wendt, 1999: 131, 229-30). Thus, through the emergence of the deterrence norm and the construction of deterrence identities, the actors create an intersubjective context and intersubjective understandings that in turn affect their interests and routines. In this context, deterrence strategy and deterrence practices are better understood by the actors, and therefore the continuous avoidance of violence is more easily achieved. Furthermore, within such a context of deterrence relations, rationality is (re)defined, clarifying the appropriate practices for a rational actor, and this, in turn, reproduces this context and the actors’ identities. Therefore, the internalization of deterrence ideas helps to explain how actors may create more cooperative practices and break away from the spiral of hostility that is forced and maintained by the identities that are attached to the security dilemma, and which lead to mutual perception of the other as an aggressive enemy. As Wendt for example suggests, in situations where states are restrained from using violence—such as MAD (mutual assured destruction)—states not only avoid violence, but “ironically, may be willing to trust each other enough to take on collective identity”. In such cases if actors believe that others have no desire to engulf them, then it will be easier to trust them and to identify with their own needs (Wendt, 1999: 358-9). In this respect, the norm of deterrence, the trust that is being built between the opponents, and the (mutual) constitution of their role identities may all lead to the creation of long term influences that preserve the practices of deterrence as well as the avoidance of violence. Since a basic level of trust is needed to attain ontological security,21 the existence of it may further strengthen the practices of deterrence and the actors’ identities of deterrer and deterred actors. In this respect, I argue that for the reasons mentioned earlier, the practices of deterrence should be understood as providing both physical and ontological security, thus refuting that there is necessarily tension between them. Exactly for this reason I argue that Rasmussen’s (2002: 331-2) assertion—according to which MAD was about enhancing ontological over physical security—is only partly correct. Certainly, MAD should be understood as providing ontological security; but it also allowed for physical security, since, compared to previous strategies and doctrines, it was all about decreasing the physical threat of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the ability to increase one dimension of security helped to enhance the other, since it strengthened the actors’ identities and created more stable expectations of avoiding violence.

#### Realism inevitable and good to solve war

Kaplan 11 (Robert, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and author "Libya, Obama and the triumph of realism" Aug 28, [www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a76d2ab4-cf2d-11e0-b6d4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1WPqHMjK3&utm\_source=twitterfeed&utm\_medium=twitter](http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a76d2ab4-cf2d-11e0-b6d4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1WPqHMjK3&utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter), AD: 11/5/11)

Realism is dead, clamour the cheerleaders of the Arab spring. The collapse of dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt, and now Libya heralds a new birth of freedom that supposedly consigns realism to the graveyard. But Barack Obama – by taking part in the Libyan operation but not leading it – has been nothing if not a realist. Realism, as a theory of international relations, posits that tragedy is not the triumph of evil over good, but instead the triumph of one good over another that causes suffering. It was the US president’s realist views that led him to argue against taking a leadership role in [Libya](http://www.ft.com/intl/indepth/libya-uprising), to keep America’s powder dry for more important crises to come – a demonstrable good. Realism also keeps Mr Obama from owning post-Gaddafi Libya, which is destined, even in the best of circumstances, to be a weak and fragile state. Here he is supporting democracy where he can, and stability where he must. He provides diplomatic support for protesters in Syria but will not intervene. He longs for a democratic rebellion in Iran but fears such a rebellion in Saudi Arabia. That, coupled with his impatience for troop withdrawals in Afghanistan, implies a rejection of nation-building in the Middle East, so as – in effect – to focus on something more crucial: maintaining US maritime power in Asia. Thus does realism triumph. Realism supposedly died at the end of the cold war, when the spread of free societies across eastern Europe highlighted the role of idealism in foreign policy. But then came the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, and the debacle of Iraq, and realism rose from the ashes. It will rise again now, given that the Middle East and East Asia are bound to get messier. Today’s attacks on realism are just as spurious as those that came before. It is said the theory failed the US by providing the rationale to support Arab dictators. But for any foreign policy to stay relevant for so long is itself a mark of success. The US also derived great benefits from this policy: stable bilateral relations and Arab-Israeli peace agreements ensued; trade routes in the Mediterranean and Arabian seas, on which global commerce and energy supplies depend, were made secure. More important, the political and technological conditions for democratic change in the Arab world were not propitious until recently, and the US should never be in the business of demanding revolutionary overthrows across a quarter of the earth for years on end. Realism counsels dealing with the material at hand, not seeking perennially to change it from half a world away. There is also the charge that realism is cynical, and does not therefore represent western values. But realism in the service of the national interest is the most consistently humanitarian approach possible – because realism is about the avoidance of war through the maintenance of a balance of power. The humanitarian interventionism in the Balkans notwithstanding, the greatest humanitarian gesture in living memory was US president Richard Nixon’s trip to China in 1972, engineered by Henry Kissinger, his national security adviser. By dropping the notion that Taiwan was the real China, they obtained China’s agreement to stop supporting communist insurgencies throughout south-east Asia. Also, with the US implicitly providing protection against the Soviet Union and an economically resurgent Japan, China was able to devote itself to the peaceful growth that would lift most of Asia out of poverty. As more than a billion people saw their living standards rise, there was a consequent explosion of personal freedoms. Such can be the wages of realism. Declaring realism dead because of events in the Middle East is also to demonstrate profound ignorance about Asia. There, nationalism is on the rise, as are military budgets. A half-dozen rising naval powers, principally China, have competing claims in the energy-rich South China Sea. This is a world of amoral balance-of-power calculations that will help define the 21st century. The futures of Libya, Yemen and Syria will all be decidedly troubled, even after all their dictators are overthrown, while post-Mubarak Egypt is an economic wreck with Nasserite and Islamist tendencies. In truth, the Middle East is undergoing less a democratic revolution than a crisis in central authority. Because instability is a given, realism – which counsels that interests are paramount in facing a multiplicity of situations – will once again prove to be the only credible belief system for those who, like Mr Obama, seek to wield power.

#### Alt doesn’t generate political movements

O'Callaghan ‘2 ( Lecturer in IR, 02 (Terry , lecturer in the school of International Relations at the University of South Australia, International Relations and the third debate, ed: Jarvis, 2002, p. 80-81)

There are also a host of technological and logistical questions that plague George's scheme and make problematic his recommendations. For example, through what medium are those on the fringes of the international system going to speak to the world? Although it may be true that the third world has now been integrated into the global polity via the advent of technological innovations in communications, allowing for remote access to information sources and the Internet, it also remains true that the majority of those on the fringes continue to be disenfranchised from such mediums, whether as a result of a lack of economic resources, the prevalence of illiteracy, or social, cultural and political circumstances that systemically exclude, women (among others) from economic resources and certain political and social freedoms. Need we remind George that social, political, and individual autonomy is at a minimum in these parts of the world, and an intellectual approach as controversial as postmodernism is not likely to achieve the sorts of goals that George optimistically foreshadows. Indeed, on practical questions such as these, matters otherwise central to the success of postmodern visions, George prefers to be vague, suggesting instead that the intricacies of such details will somehow work themselves out in a manner satisfactory to all. Such a position reveals George's latent idealism and underscores how George's schema is an intellectual one: a theory of international politics written for other theorists of international politics. George's audience is thus a very limited and elite audience and begs the question of whether a senior, middle-class scholar in the intellectual heartland of Australia can do anything of real substance to aid the truly marginalized and oppressed. How is it possible to put oneself in the shoes of the "other," to advocate on his or her behalf, when such is done from a position of affluence, unrelated to and far removed from the experiences of those whom George otherwise champions? Ideals are all good and well, but it is hard to imagine that the computer keyboard is mightier than the sword, and hard to see how a small, elite, affluent assortment of intellectuals is going to generate the type of political momentum necessary to allow those on the fringes to speak and be heard! 1 . Moreover, why should we assume that states and individuals want to listen and will listen to what the marginalized and the oppressed have to say? There is precious little evidence to suggest that "listening" is something the advanced capitalist countries do very well at all. Indeed, one of the allegations so forcefully alleged by Muslim fundamentalists as justification for the terrorist attacks of September I I is precisely that the West, and America in particular, are deaf to the disenfranchised and impoverished in the world. Certainly, there are agencies and individuals who are sensitive to the needs of the "marginalized" and who champion institutional forums where indigenous voices can be heard. But on even the most optimistic reckoning, such forums and institutions represent the exception, not the rule, and remain in the minority if not dwarfed by those institutions that represent Western, first world interests. To be sure, this is a realist power-political image of the current configuration of the global polity, but one apparently, and ironically, endorsed by George if only because it speaks to the realities of the marginalized, the imposed silences, and the multitude of oppressions on which George founds his call for a postmodern ethic. Recognizing such realities, however, does not explain George's penchant for ignoring them entirely, especially in terms of the structural rigidities they pose for meaningful reform. Indeed, George's desire to move to a new "space beyond International Relations" smacks of wishful idealism, ignoring the current configuration of global political relations and power distribution; of the incessant ideological power of hyperindividualism, consumerism, advertising, Hollywood images, and fashion icons; and of the innate power bestowed on the (institutional) barons of global finance, trade, and transnational production. George seems to have little appreciation of the structural impediments such institutions pose for radical change of the type he so fiercely advocates. Revolutionary change of the kind desired by George ignores that fact that many individuals are not disposed to concerns beyond their family, friends, and daily work lives. And institutional, structural transformation requires organized effort, mass popular support, and dogged single-mindedness if societal norms are to be challenged, institutional reform enacted, consumer tastes altered, and political sensibilities reformed. Convincing Nike that there is something intrinsically wrong with paying Indonesian workers a few dollars a week to manufacture shoes for the global market requires considerably more effort than postmodern platitudes and/or moral indignation. The cycle of wealth creation and distribution that sees Michael Jordan receive multimillion dollar contracts to inspire demand for Nike products, while the foot soldiers in the factory eke out a meager existence producing these same products is not easily, or realistically, challenged by pronouncements of moving beyond International Relations to a new, nicer, gentler nirvana. More generally, of course, what George fails to consider is the problem of apathy and of how we get people to care about the plight of others. What do we with the CEOs of multinational corporations, stockbrokers, accountants, ctory workers, and the unemployed, who, by and large, fail to consider the omeless and destitute in their own countries, let alone in places they have never isited and are never likely to visit? Moral indignation rarely translates into action, and apathy about the plight of others is a structural impediment as strong any idea, theory, or writing. What George's treatise thus fails to consider is how we overcome this, and how we get others to listen. He needs to explain how the social, political, psychological, and moral structures that define the parameters of existence for the many millions of ordinary citizens in the first world, and that deflects attention from the marginalized and the oppressed can be broken down. Unfortunately, there is little to indicate that George has thought much about this, suggesting that his commitment to postmodern theory is not likely to make much difference. In fact, in the academy the postmodern light is already beginning to dim in certain quarters, having registered scarcely a glimmer in the broader polity, where, if change was to ensue, it needed to burn brightly. Even among those versed in the nomenclature of scholarly debate, theorists of international politics remain skeptical of the value of postmodern discourse, by and large rejecting it. This does not portend well for postmodern visionaries and the future of postmodern discourse. But can George really be surprised by this? After all, his discourse indicts the "backward discipline" for complicity in crimes against humanity, calling for a repudiation of realism and with it a repudiation of the lifelong beliefs and writings of eminent theorists like Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, and Stephen Krasner who have otherwise defined the parameters of the discipline, its projects, and research agendas. Can George really expect discipline-wide capitulation to an intellectual diaspora that would see theorists repudiate their beliefs and works in order to take up the creed of postmodernism, as vague, open-ended, and indeterminate as it is? Without a clear and credible plan of how to get from "incarceration and closure" to intellectual freedom, creativity, and openness, George's postmodern musings have understandably attracted few disciples.

## Addon

### Hegemony Addon- Water Wars

#### Heg stops water wars

Brzezinski ‘12 (Zbigniew, National Security Advisor in the Carter Administration, Professor of Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University, “Strategic Vision: America and the crisis for global power” book, 2012)

The latter is likely to be the case especially in regard to the increasingly scarce water resources in many countries. According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), by 2025 more than 2.8 billion people will be living in either water-scarce or water-stressed regions, as global demand for water will double every twenty years. While much of the Southern Hemisphere is threatened by potential water scarcity, interstate conflicts—the geopolitical consequences of crossborder water scarcity—are most likely to occur in Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and northeastern Africa, regions where limited water resources are shared across borders and political stability is transient. The combination of political insecurity and resource scarcity is a menacing geopolitical combination. The threat of water conflicts is likely to intensify as the economic growth and increasing demand for water in emerging powers like Turkey and India collides with instability and resource scarcity in rival countries like Iraq and Pakistan. Water scarcity will also test China’s internal stability as its burgeoning population and growing industrial complex combine to increase demand for and decrease supply of usable water. In South Asia, the never-ending political tension between India and Pakistan combined with overcrowding and Pakistan’s heightening internal crises may put the Indus Water Treaty at risk, especially because the river basin originates in the long-disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, an area of ever-increasing political and military volatility. The lingering dispute between India and China over the status of Northeast India, an area through which the vital Brahmaputra River flows, also remains a serious concern. As American hegemony disappears and regional competition intensifies, disputes over natural resources like water have the potential to develop into full-scale conflicts.

### Hegemony Addon- Asia

#### Primacy is the lynchpin of Asian stability

Lieber ‘5 (PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, page 158)

Parallels between America’s role in East Asia and its involvements in Europe might seem far-fetched. Asia’s geography and history are enormously different, there is no regional organization in any way comparable to the European Union, the area is not a zone of peace, conflict among its leading states remains a potential risk, and there is nothing remotely resembling NATO as a formal multilateral alliance binding the United States to the region’s security and the regional states to one another. Yet, as in Europe, the United States plays a unique stabilizing role in Asia that no other country or organization is capable of playing. Far from being a source of tension or instability, this presence tends to reduce competition among regional powers and to deter armed conflict. Disengagement, as urged by some critics of American primacy, would probably lead to more dangerous competition or power-balancing among the principal countries of Asia as well as to a more unstable security environment and the spread of nuclear weapons. As a consequence, even China acquiesces in America’s regional role despite the fact that it is the one country with the long-term potential to emerge as a true major power competitor.

#### Nuclear war

Landay 2k (Jonathon, National Security and Intelligence Correspondent with 15 Years of Experience for Night Ridder, “Top administration officials warn stakes for US are high in Asian conflicts,” March 11th, Lexis)

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. "We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster."

### Hegemony Addon- Taiwan

#### Hegemony prevents Taiwan conflict

Marquardt ‘4 (Erich, Senior Editor with the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, “Beijing Tests Washington’s Resolve in East Asia”, <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=189&language_id=1>, July 28, 2004)

Additionally, the failure of Washington to successfully pacify Iraq has demonstrated the limits of American power. While Washington retains a tremendous military advantage over other states in the world, that advantage is primarily technological, and only extends to the point of when an occupation of a foreign country becomes necessary The perceived erosion of American power has led to a loss of U.S. power since other states potentially hostile to U.S. interests now believe that Washington will be less likely to directly challenge them. This belief is evident in China's recent posturing over Taiwan, where Beijing is challenging American resolve in East Asia by intensifying its threats toward Taipei. Taiwan, which China considers a renegade province, may become the location where China will conduct a test of U.S. resolve. Beijing has continued to direct some 500 short-range missiles toward the island. One objective of this missile deployment is to increase Beijing's chances of executing a successful "decapitation strike" where, in one opening salvo, China would be able to neuter Taipei's military and political structure, effectively forcing the island to comply with China's demands of reunification. To highlight its seriousness, China last week conducted its eighth annual military exercises in the Taiwan Strait on an island only 174 miles from Taiwanese territory. The exercises consisted of some 18,000 Chinese troops, involving land, air and sea maneuvers. Beijing quite bluntly announced that the purpose of the exercises was to simulate an invasion of Taiwan. Even more candidly, Jiang Zemin, the chief of the Communist Party's Central Military Commission, promised that China would recover Taiwan by 2020, through the use of force if necessary.  Beijing's recent posturing reflects Taipei's continued flirts with independence. Chen Shui-bian, the Taiwanese president who was recently reelected, held as his central campaign theme the importance of an independent Taiwan. Chen also announced that he would be revising the Taiwanese constitution, a move that could attempt to institutionalize Taiwan as a sovereign state, permanently separated from the mainland.  Chen's reelection and subsequent controversial actions explain why Beijing is flaunting its military might; the one issue it does not seem capable of negotiating on is the status of Taiwan. Furthermore, in light of the U.S. being overburdened in the Middle East, China now considers it the ideal time to test Washington's resolve in the region. Certainly, the U.S. still retains the military ability to engage Chinese forces should they attempt to invade Taiwan; nevertheless, the fact that U.S. forces are so embroiled in other areas of the world means that any such engagement would be risky for the United States, and therefore less likely to occurBeijing no doubt recognizes this and is now testing to see how far Washington will go to protect the small Taiwanese island from invasion by a state as large and potentially powerful as China. Since China is becoming such a force to contend with in the region, it seems a natural development that Taiwan will soon be engulfed by the mainland; it is not clear how beneficial it would be for the United States to risk a military engagement to impede such efforts. If Taiwan continues to flirt with independence, it is uncertain how long China will continue to refrain from taking serious action against the island. Similar to how the United States effectively prevented European powers from exploiting the markets in the Americas by establishing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, China will follow its own doctrine to prevent the United States from exploiting markets in East Asia.   It will be important for the United States, which benefits tremendously -- strategically and economically -- from its immense influence in East Asia, to prevent China from gaining hegemony over the area. In order to stunt this possibility, Washington will need to devise methods and strategies to meet increased Chinese regional influence.

#### That goes nuclear

Lowther 3/16 (William Lowther, Staff Rreporter in Washington, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report”, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211>, March 16, 2013)

Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and the US, a new academic report concludes. “Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwan’s independence, while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense. “Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements,” the report says. In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.” The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis. “This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation,” Betts wrote in a separate study of his own. The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.” Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do “provide kindling” for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US. The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says. “Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of suspicion,” the report says. For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party. To make things worse, “neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says.

### Congess Addon- Power of the Purse

#### Congress exerting the power of the purse key to check presidential warfare

Fisher ‘7 (Louis Fisher is a specialist in constitutional law with the Law Library of the Library of Congress, after working for the Congressional Research Service from 1970 to March 6, 2006. During his service with CRS he was research di rector of the House Iran-Contra Committee in 1987, writing major sections of the final report. Fish er received his doctorate in political science from the New School for Social Research and has taught at a number of universities and law schools, appearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, loc.gov/law/help/usconlaw/pdf/Feingold2007rev.pdf, “Exercising Congress’s Constitutional Power to End a War”, January 30, 2007)

The framers carefully studied this monarchical model and repudiated it in its entirety. Not a single one of Blackstone’s prerogatives was granted to the President. They are either assigned entirely to Congress (declare war, issue letters of marque and reprisal, raise and regulate fleets and armies) or shared between the Senate and the President (appointing ambassadors and making treaties). The rejection of the British and monarchical models could not have been more sweeping. This explains what the framers did. The next question is why they did it. The framers gave Congress the power to initiate war because they concluded — based on the history of other nations — that Executives, in their quest for fame and personal glory, had too great an appetite for war and little care for their subjects or the long-term interests of their country. John Jay, whose experience in the Continental Congress and the early years of the Republic was generally in foreign affairs, warned in Federalist No. 4 that “absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such as a thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans. These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people.” Joseph Story, who served on the Supreme Court from 1811 to 1845, similarly wrote about the need to vest in the representative branch the decision to go to war. The power to declare war “is in its own nature and effects so critical and calamitous, that it requires the utmost deliberation, and the successive review of all the councils of the nations. War, in its best estate, never fails to impose upon the people the most burthensome taxes, and personal sufferings. It is always injurious, and sometime subversive of the great commercial, manufacturing, and agricultural interests.” Story found war as “sometimes fatal to public liberty itself, by introducing a spirit of military glory, which is ready to follow, wherever a successful commander will lead.” Through their study of history and political ambition, the framers came to fear the Executive appetite for war. Human nature has not changed over the years to justify trust in independent and unchecked presidential decisions in war. The record of two centuries in America teaches us that what Jay said in 1788 applies equally well to contemporary times. Offensive and Defensive Wars The debates at the Philadelphia Convention in 1787 underscore the framers’ intent to keep offensive wars in the hands of Congress while reserving to the President certain actions of a defensive nature. All three branches understood that distinction for 160 years, until President Truman went to war against North Korea by going to the UN Security Council for “authority” instead of to Congress. Review what the framers said in Philadelphia. On June 1, 1787, Charles Pinckney offered his support for “a vigorous Executive but was afraid the Executive powers of <the existing> Congress might extend to peace & war &c which would render the Executive a Monarchy, of the worst kind, towit an elective one.” 1 Farrand 64-65. John Rutledge wanted the executive power placed in a single person, “tho’ he was not for giving him the power of war and peace.” James Wilson, who also preferred a single executive, “did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace &c.” Id. at 65-66. Edmund Randolph worried about executive power, calling it “the foetus of monarchy.” The delegates to the Philadelphia Convention, he said, had “no motive to be governed by the British Governmt. as our prototype.” Alexander Hamilton, in a lengthy speech on June 18, strongly supported a vigorous and independent President, but plainly jettisoned the British model of executive prerogatives in foreign affairs and the war power. In discarding the Lockean and Blackstonian doctrines of executive power, he proposed giving the Senate the “sole power of declaring war.” The President would be authorized to have “the direction of war when authorized or begun.” Id. at 292. In Federalist No. 69, Hamilton explained the break with English precedents. The power of the king “extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies.” The delegates decided to place those powers, he said, in Congress. At the constitutional convention, Charles Pinckney objected that legislative proceedings “were too slow” for the safety of the country in an emergency, since he expected Congress to meet but once a year. James Madison and Elbridge Gerry moved to amend the draft constitution, empowering Congress to “declare war” instead of to “make war.” This change in language would leave to the President “the power to repel sudden attacks.” Their motion carried. 2 Farrand 318-19. Reactions to the Madison-Gerry amendment reinforce the narrow grant of authority to the President. Pierce Butler wanted to give the President the power to make war, arguing that he “will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the Nation will support it.” Not a single delegate supported him. Roger Sherman objected: “The Executive shd. be able to repel and not to commence war.” Id. at 318. Gerry said he “never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.” George Mason spoke “agst giving the power of war to the Executive, because not <safely> to be trusted with it. . . . He was for clogging rather than facilitating war.” 2 Farrand 319. His remarks echo what Jay said in Federalist No. 4. At the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, James Wilson expressed the prevailing sentiment that the system of checks and balances “will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large.” 2 Elliot 528. The power of initiating war was vested in Congress. To the President was left certain defensive powers “to repel sudden attacks.” This distrust of presidential power in matters of war was expressed frequently after the Philadelphia convention. In 1793, Madison called war “the true nurse of executive aggrandizement. . . . In war, the honours and emoluments of office are to be multiplied; and it is the executive patronage under which they are to be enjoyed. It is in war, finally, that laurels are to be gathered; and it is the executive brow they are to encircle. The strongest passions and most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast; ambition, avarice, vanity, the honourable or venial 4 love of fame, are all in conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace.” Five years later, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, Madison said that the Constitution “supposes, what the History of all Govts demonstrates, that the Ex. is the branch of power most interested in war, & most prone to 5 it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the question of war in the Legisl.” The need to keep the purse and the sword in separate hands was a bedrock principle for the framers. They recalled the efforts of English kings who, denied funds from Parliament, decided to rely on outside sources of revenue for their military expeditions. The result was civil war and the loss of Charles I of both his office and his head. The growth of democratic government is directly tied to legislative control over all expenditures, including those for fo and military affairs. reign The U.S. Constitution attempted to avoid the British history of civil war and bloodshed by vesting the power of the purse wholly in Congress. Under Article I, Section 9, “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” In Federalist No. 48, Madison explained that “the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the people.” The President gained the title of Commander in Chief but Congress retained the power to finance military operations. For Madison, it was a fundamental principle of democratic government that “[t]hose who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded. They are barred from the latter functions by a great principle in free government, analogous to that which separates the sword from the purse, or the power of executing from the power of enacting laws.” This understanding of the war power was widely understood. Jefferson praised the transfer of the war power “from the executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay.”

### 1AR- NW Impact

#### Causes nuclear war

Symonds ‘13 [Peter, leading staff writer for the World Socialist Web Site and a member of its International Editorial Board. He has written extensively on Middle Eastern and Asian politics, contributing articles on developments in a wide range of countries, “Obama’s “playbook” and the threat of nuclear war in Asia,” <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/04/05/pers-a05.html>, April 5, 2013]

The Obama administration has engaged in reckless provocations against North Korea over the past month, inflaming tensions in North East Asia and heightening the risks of war. Its campaign has been accompanied by the relentless demonising of the North Korean regime and claims that the US military build-up was purely “defensive”. However, the Wall Street Journal and CNN revealed yesterday that the Pentagon was following a step-by-step plan, dubbed “the playbook”, drawn up months in advance and approved by the Obama administration earlier in the year. The flights to South Korea by nuclear capable B-52 bombers on March 8 and March 26, by B-2 bombers on March 28, and by advanced F-22 Raptor fighters on March 31 were all part of the script.¶ There is of course nothing “defensive” about B-52 and B-2 nuclear strategic bombers. The flights were designed to demonstrate, to North Korea in the first instance, the ability of the US military to conduct nuclear strikes at will anywhere in North East Asia. The Pentagon also exploited the opportunity to announce the boosting of anti-ballistic missile systems in the Asia Pacific and to station two US anti-missile destroyers off the Korean coast.¶ According to CNN, the “playbook” was drawn up by former defence secretary Leon Panetta and “supported strongly” by his replacement, Chuck Hagel. The plan was based on US intelligence assessments that “there was a low probability of a North Korean military response”—in other words, that Pyongyang posed no serious threat. Unnamed American officials claimed that Washington was now stepping back, amid concerns that the US provocations “could lead to miscalculations” by North Korea.¶ However, having deliberately ignited one of the most dangerous flashpoints in Asia, there are no signs that the Obama administration is backing off. Indeed, on Wednesday, Defence Secretary Hagel emphasised the military threat posed by North Korea, declaring that it presented “a real and clear danger”. The choice of words was deliberate and menacing—an echo of the phrase “a clear and present danger” used to justify past US wars of aggression.¶ The unstable and divided North Korean regime has played directly into the hands of Washington. Its bellicose statements and empty military threats have nothing to do with a genuine struggle against imperialism and are inimical to the interests of the international working class. Far from opposing imperialism, its Stalinist leaders are looking for a deal with the US and its allies to end their decades-long economic blockade and open up the country as a new cheap labour platform for global corporations.¶ As the present standoff shows, Pyongyang’s acquisition of a few crude nuclear weapons has in no way enhanced its defence against an American attack. The two B-2 stealth bombers that flew to South Korea could unleash enough nuclear weapons to destroy the country’s entire industrial and military capacity and murder even more than the estimated 2 million North Korean civilians killed by the three years of US war in Korea in the 1950s.¶ North Korea’s wild threats to attack American, Japanese and South Korean cities only compound the climate of fear used by the ruling classes to divide the international working class—the only social force capable of preventing war.¶ Commentators in the international media speculate endlessly on the reasons for the North Korean regime’s behaviour. But the real question, which is never asked, should be: why is the Obama administration engaged in the dangerous escalation of tensions in North East Asia? The latest US military moves go well beyond the steps taken in December 2010, when the US and South Korean navies held provocative joint exercises in water adjacent to both North Korea and China.¶ Obama’s North Korea “playbook” is just one aspect of his so-called “pivot to Asia”—a comprehensive diplomatic, economic and military strategy aimed at ensuring the continued US domination of Asia. The US has stirred up flashpoints throughout the region and created new ones, such as the conflict between Japan and China over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. Obama’s chief target is not economically bankrupt North Korea, but its ally China, which Washington regards as a dangerous potential rival. Driven by the deepening global economic crisis, US imperialism is using its military might to assert its hegemony over Asia and the entire planet.¶ The US has declared that its military moves against North Korea are designed to “reassure” its allies, Japan and South Korea, that it will protect them. Prominent figures in both countries have called for the development of their own nuclear weapons. US “reassurances” are aimed at heading off a nuclear arms race in North East Asia—not to secure peace, but to reinforce the American nuclear monopoly.¶ The ratcheting-up of tensions over North Korea places enormous pressures on China and the newly-selected leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. An unprecedented public debate has opened up in Beijing over whether or not to continue to support Pyongyang. The Chinese leadership has always regarded the North Korean regime as an important buffer on its northeastern borders, but now fears that the constant tension on the Korean peninsula will be exploited by the US and its allies to launch a huge military build-up.¶ Indeed, all of the Pentagon’s steps over the past month—the boosting of anti-missile systems and practice runs of nuclear capable bombers—have enhanced the ability of the US to fight a nuclear war against China. Moreover, the US may not want to provoke a war, but its provocations always run the risk of escalating dangerously out of control. Undoubtedly, Obama’s “playbook” for war in Asia contains many more steps beyond the handful leaked to the media. The Pentagon plans for all eventualities, including the possibility that a Korean crisis could bring the US and China head to head in a catastrophic nuclear conflict.

### Congress Addon- Groupthink

Checks on the executive key to solve groupthink

Chehab, 12 [Ahmad, Georgetown University Law Center, Retrieving the Role of Accountability in the Targeted Killings Context: A Proposal for Judicial Review]

The practical, pragmatic justification for the COAACC derives largely from considering social psychological findings regarding the skewed potential associated with limiting unchecked decision-making in a group of individuals. As an initial point, psychologists have long pointed out how individuals frequently fall prey to cognitive illusions that produce systematic errors in judgment.137 People simply do not make decisions by choosing the optimal outcome from available alternatives, but instead employ shortcuts (i.e., heuristics) for convenience.138 Cognitive biases like groupthink can hamper effective policy deliberations and formulations.139 Groupthink largely arises when a group of decision-makers seek conformity and agreement, thereby avoiding alternative points of view that are critical of the consensus position.140 This theory suggests that some groups—particularly those characterized by a strong leader, considerable internal cohesion, internal loyalty, overconfidence, and a shared world view or value system—suffer from a deterioration in their capacity to engage in critical analysis.141 Many factors can affect such judgment, including a lack of crucial information, insufficient timing for decision-making, poor judgment, pure luck, and/or unexpected actions by adversaries.142 Moreover, decision-makers inevitably tend to become influenced by irrelevant information,143 seek out data and assessments that confirm their beliefs and personal hypotheses notwithstanding contradictory evidence,144 and “[i]rrationally avoid choices that represent extremes when a decision involves a trade-off between two incommensurable values.”145 Self-serving biases can also hamper judgment given as it has been shown to induce well-intentioned people to rationalize virtually any behavior, judgment or action after the fact.146 The confirmation and overconfidence bias, both conceptually related to groupthink, also result in large part from neglecting to consider contradictory evidence coupled with an irrational persistence in pursuing ideological positions divorced from concern of alternative viewpoints.147 Professor Cass Sunstein has described situations in which groupthink produced poor results precisely because consensus resulted from the failure to consider alternative sources of information.148 The failures of past presidents to consider alternative sources of information, critically question risk assessments, ensure neutral-free ideological sentiment among those deliberating,149 and/or generally ensure properly deliberated national security policy has produced prominent and devastating blunders,150 including the Iraq War of 2003,151 the Bay of Pigs debacle in the 1960’s,152 and the controversial decision to wage war against Vietnam.153 Professor Sunstein also has described the related phenomenon of “group polarization,” which includes the tendency to push group members toward a “more extreme position.”154 Given that both groupthink and group polarization can lead to erroneous and ideologically tainted policy positions, the notion of giving the President unchecked authority in determining who is eligible for assassination can only serve to increase the likelihood for committing significant errors.155 The reality is that psychological mistakes, organizational ineptitude, lack of structural coherence and other associated deficiencies are inevitable features in Executive Branch decision-making. D. THE NEED FOR ACCOUNTABILITY CHECKS To check the vices of groupthink and shortcomings of human judgment, the psychology literature emphasizes a focus on accountability mechanisms in which a better reasoned decision-making process can flourish.156 By serving as a constraint on behavior, “accountability functions as a critical norm-enforcement mechanism—the social psychological link between individual decision makers on the one hand and social systems on the other.”157 Such institutional review can channel recognition for the need by government decision-makers to be more self-critical in policy targeted killing designations, more willing to consider alternative points of view, and more willing to anticipate possible objections.158 Findings have also shown that ex ante awareness can lead to more reasoned judgment while also preventing tendentious and ideological inclinations (and political motivations incentivized and exploited by popular hysteria and fear).159 Requiring accounting in a formalized way prior to engaging in a targeted killing—by providing, for example, in camera review, limited declassification of information, explaining threat assessments outside the immediate circle of policy advisors, and securing meaningful judicial review via a COAACC-like tribunal—can promote a more reliable and informed deliberation in the executive branch. With process-based judicial review, the COAACC could effectively reorient the decision to target individuals abroad by examining key procedural aspects—particularly assessing the reliability of the “terrorist” designation—and can further incentivize national security policy-makers to engage in more carefully reasoned choices and evaluate available alternatives than when subject to little to no review.

#### **Key to solve war**

Jervis, 4(Robert, political science and international politics professor at Columbia University and a consultant to the CIA, The Record, 7/14, lexis)

But was that indeed what happened? "Groupthink" - identified in the early 1970s by the late Yale psychologist Irving Janis - refers to a process by which conformity grows out of deliberations in small groups. It can indeed be quite powerful. The way Janis explained it, groupthink operates when individuals work closely together over a sustained period. It isn't merely that members of the group come to think alike but that they come to overvalue the harmonious functioning of the group. In their eagerness to reach consensus, they become inhibited from questioning established assumptions or from raising questions that might disturb their colleagues and friends. A vicious circle begins as the group feels good about itself because it has discovered the truth, and this truth is accepted by each person because it is believed by the others. In this way, a group of intelligent individuals can confidently arrive at conclusions that are wildly removed from reality. Most social scientists agree that groupthink has contributed to many disastrous decisions in business, families, and foreign policy. President Kennedy and his top advisers, for instance, fell into a groupthink trap, believing that the landings of the Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 might overthrow Fidel Castro. Intense face-to-face meetings among the president's top foreign policy planners formed strong bonds that no one wanted to loosen. In hindsight, their plans were so badly flawed that it is hard to understand how such world-wise leaders could have endorsed them. But apparently each individual grew confident because the others were - each was reassured because the group was functioning so well and without discord; no one felt the need, or had the nerve, to insist they consider the possibility that the group was on the totally wrong track.

Richard Nixon's Watergate cover-up was in part maintained by the same dynamic. To many outsiders even at the time, it was obvious that the only way for Nixon to survive was to air the full truth early on. But the Nixon White House was a small group, closed-mouthed and predisposed to keeping everything secret.

### Congress Addon- Obama Adventurism

#### Unchecked drones cause Obama adventurism and global warfare- Congressional signal is key

**Friedman ’12** [Benjamin H. Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute, “Drones, Special Operations and Whimsical Wars,” <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/drones-special-operations-whimsical-wars-7085>]

The official rationale for using force across the world is that Al Qaeda is global. But that’s true only thanks to a capacious definition of Al Qaeda that imposes a sense of false unity of disparate groups. The always-overrated remnant of the organization that sponsored the 9/11 attacks barely exists anymore, even in Pakistan. Our counterterrorism efforts are directed mostly against others: terrorists that take up Al Qaeda’s name and desire to kill Westerners but have limited links to the real McCoy, as in Yemen and North Africa, and insurgents friendly to jihadists but mostly consumed by local disputes, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, Al Shabaab in Somalia and Al Qaeda’s Islamist allies in southern Yemen. Like the phony communist monolith in the Cold War, the myth of a unified, global “Al Qaeda” makes actions against vaguely linked entities—many with no obvious interest in the United States—seem a coherent campaign against globe trotting menace bent on our destruction.¶ The real reason we are fighting so much these days is that war is too easy. International and domestic restraints on the use of U.S. military power are few. And unrestrained power tends to be exercised. Presidents can use it whimsically, at least until they do something costly that creates a backlash and wakes up public opposition. Drones and special-operations forces made this problem worse. Most of the world is what the military calls a permissive environment, especially since the end of the Cold War. Most places lack forces capable of keeping our military out. Many potential allies invite it. The risks traditionally associated with war—invasion, mass death, etc.—are now alien to Americans. Since the draft ended, the consequences of even bad wars for most of us are minor: unsettling media stories and mildly higher taxes deferred by deficits. That’s why, as Nuno Monteiro argues, the U.S. military was already quite busy in the 1990s despite the absence of real enemies.¶ Because war is so cheap, the public has little reason to worry much about it. That leaves elected representatives without any electoral incentive to restrain presidential war powers. No surprise then that the imperial presidency grew as American power did. Technology gains and secrecy exacerbate the problem. Even more than strategic bombing from high altitude, which already prevented U.S. casualties, drones cheapen warfare. Covert raids are riskier, of course, but secrecy limits public appreciation of those risks.¶ The president and his advisors assure us that they use these forces only after solemn debate and nights spent (badly) reading just war theory. But a White House that debates the use of force only with itself short-circuits the democratic process. That is not just a constitutional problem but a practical one. Broad debate among competing powers generally produces better decisions than narrower, unilateral ones. That is why is it is naive to suggest, as John Fabian Witt did last week in a New York Times op-ed, that the executive branch is developing sensible legal institutions to manage the gray area between war and peace occupied by drone strikes. What’s needed are checks and balances. That means Congress needs to use its war powers.¶ First, Congress should rewrite the 2001 Authorization of Military Force, which has morphed into a legal rationale for doing whatever presidents want in the name of counterterrorism. That bill authorized force against the organizers of the September 11 attacks and those who aided them, which seemed to mean Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and maybe Pakistan. The new law should state that acts of war, including drone strikes, in other places require a new authorization of force. If Congress is for bombing stuff in Yemen and Somalia, it should debate those missions. Second, Congress should reform the convoluted laws governing the deployment of special operations forces, making their use more onerous and transparent. Those forces should engage in covert action only after a presidential finding, as with the CIA. Third, Congress should require that taxes or offsets fund wars. That would increase debate about their worth.¶ The trouble, as already noted, is that Congress has no interest in doing these things. Congressional leaders are today more interested in policing leaks about the president’s unilateral exercise of war powers than in restraining them. Short of a military disaster involving special-operations forces or drones, this seems unlikely to change in the short term. In the longer term, we need a restoration of Congress’ institutional identity. Even without an electoral reason, politicians should want to exercise war powers simply because they can—because people like power. That’s the assumption behind Edward Corwin’s notion that the constitution’s is an “invitation to struggle” over foreign policy. Something has obstructed Congress’ desire to struggle. Those concerned by the president’s promiscuous use of force should try to identify and remove the obstruction.

#### Causes nuclear war

Symonds ‘13 [Peter, leading staff writer for the World Socialist Web Site and a member of its International Editorial Board. He has written extensively on Middle Eastern and Asian politics, contributing articles on developments in a wide range of countries, “Obama’s “playbook” and the threat of nuclear war in Asia,” <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/04/05/pers-a05.html>, April 5, 2013]

The Obama administration has engaged in reckless provocations against North Korea over the past month, inflaming tensions in North East Asia and heightening the risks of war. Its campaign has been accompanied by the relentless demonising of the North Korean regime and claims that the US military build-up was purely “defensive”. However, the Wall Street Journal and CNN revealed yesterday that the Pentagon was following a step-by-step plan, dubbed “the playbook”, drawn up months in advance and approved by the Obama administration earlier in the year. The flights to South Korea by nuclear capable B-52 bombers on March 8 and March 26, by B-2 bombers on March 28, and by advanced F-22 Raptor fighters on March 31 were all part of the script.¶ There is of course nothing “defensive” about B-52 and B-2 nuclear strategic bombers. The flights were designed to demonstrate, to North Korea in the first instance, the ability of the US military to conduct nuclear strikes at will anywhere in North East Asia. The Pentagon also exploited the opportunity to announce the boosting of anti-ballistic missile systems in the Asia Pacific and to station two US anti-missile destroyers off the Korean coast.¶ According to CNN, the “playbook” was drawn up by former defence secretary Leon Panetta and “supported strongly” by his replacement, Chuck Hagel. The plan was based on US intelligence assessments that “there was a low probability of a North Korean military response”—in other words, that Pyongyang posed no serious threat. Unnamed American officials claimed that Washington was now stepping back, amid concerns that the US provocations “could lead to miscalculations” by North Korea.¶ However, having deliberately ignited one of the most dangerous flashpoints in Asia, there are no signs that the Obama administration is backing off. Indeed, on Wednesday, Defence Secretary Hagel emphasised the military threat posed by North Korea, declaring that it presented “a real and clear danger”. The choice of words was deliberate and menacing—an echo of the phrase “a clear and present danger” used to justify past US wars of aggression.¶ The unstable and divided North Korean regime has played directly into the hands of Washington. Its bellicose statements and empty military threats have nothing to do with a genuine struggle against imperialism and are inimical to the interests of the international working class. Far from opposing imperialism, its Stalinist leaders are looking for a deal with the US and its allies to end their decades-long economic blockade and open up the country as a new cheap labour platform for global corporations.¶ As the present standoff shows, Pyongyang’s acquisition of a few crude nuclear weapons has in no way enhanced its defence against an American attack. The two B-2 stealth bombers that flew to South Korea could unleash enough nuclear weapons to destroy the country’s entire industrial and military capacity and murder even more than the estimated 2 million North Korean civilians killed by the three years of US war in Korea in the 1950s.¶ North Korea’s wild threats to attack American, Japanese and South Korean cities only compound the climate of fear used by the ruling classes to divide the international working class—the only social force capable of preventing war.¶ Commentators in the international media speculate endlessly on the reasons for the North Korean regime’s behaviour. But the real question, which is never asked, should be: why is the Obama administration engaged in the dangerous escalation of tensions in North East Asia? The latest US military moves go well beyond the steps taken in December 2010, when the US and South Korean navies held provocative joint exercises in water adjacent to both North Korea and China.¶ Obama’s North Korea “playbook” is just one aspect of his so-called “pivot to Asia”—a comprehensive diplomatic, economic and military strategy aimed at ensuring the continued US domination of Asia. The US has stirred up flashpoints throughout the region and created new ones, such as the conflict between Japan and China over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. Obama’s chief target is not economically bankrupt North Korea, but its ally China, which Washington regards as a dangerous potential rival. Driven by the deepening global economic crisis, US imperialism is using its military might to assert its hegemony over Asia and the entire planet.¶ The US has declared that its military moves against North Korea are designed to “reassure” its allies, Japan and South Korea, that it will protect them. Prominent figures in both countries have called for the development of their own nuclear weapons. US “reassurances” are aimed at heading off a nuclear arms race in North East Asia—not to secure peace, but to reinforce the American nuclear monopoly.¶ The ratcheting-up of tensions over North Korea places enormous pressures on China and the newly-selected leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. An unprecedented public debate has opened up in Beijing over whether or not to continue to support Pyongyang. The Chinese leadership has always regarded the North Korean regime as an important buffer on its northeastern borders, but now fears that the constant tension on the Korean peninsula will be exploited by the US and its allies to launch a huge military build-up.¶ Indeed, all of the Pentagon’s steps over the past month—the boosting of anti-missile systems and practice runs of nuclear capable bombers—have enhanced the ability of the US to fight a nuclear war against China. Moreover, the US may not want to provoke a war, but its provocations always run the risk of escalating dangerously out of control. Undoubtedly, Obama’s “playbook” for war in Asia contains many more steps beyond the handful leaked to the media. The Pentagon plans for all eventualities, including the possibility that a Korean crisis could bring the US and China head to head in a catastrophic nuclear conflict.

### Environment Addon

#### Drones kill the environment

KD ’12 (Know Drones, “US DRONES ARE BLOCKING ENVIRONMENTAL REVOLUTION”, <http://www.knowdrones.com/2012/09/us-drones-are-blocking-environmental-revolution.html>, September 2012)

In 1935, retired Marine General Smedley Butler said of his military career: “I spent 33 years and four months in active military service and during that period I spent most of my time as a high class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and the bankers.” Today, if we look where US drones are attacking – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia – we find areas rich in oil, minerals, agricultural products and/or important to shipment of these commodities. We also find that these are places where natural resources have been extracted by US and European corporations for decades, not to the benefit or under the control of the majority of people. US military power has been used repeatedly to protect and reinforce the global positions of multi-national corporations. For the world, and particularly in the case of oil, this has meant an unrestrained squandering of resources and gross poisoning of the environment and accelerating global warming. Corporations after all have no legal obligation to do anything but increase profits for their shareholders. We also can see that globally, as with the Arab Spring in the Middle East, people, especially young people, are demanding control over their homelands’ resources. US drone attacks are part of an attempt to ensure that corporations will continue to enjoy their advantages in this period of awakening and that their policies of extraction will continue as before. In spite of the drone onslaught, we can see hope. For example the political/environmental movement of the Bolivian people, which has been opposed by the United States, may lead to an environmental revolution. Bolivia is getting ready to pass what The Guardian newspaper describes as the world’s first law to grant Nature rights equal to those of humans. The Law of Mother Earth, The Guardian says, “redefines the country’s rich mineral deposits as ‘blessings’ and is expected to lead to radical new conservation and social measures to reduce pollution and control industry.” Ending drone warfare and US and western military occupations will not only save lives but will speed the time when gross, wide-spread environmental destruction can be stopped by people around the world.

### Pakistan Central Asia Addon

#### Unstable Pakistan causes central asia war

[MIRZAYAN](http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&sl=auto&tl=en&u=http://expert.ru/authors/143292/&prev=_t&rurl=translate.google.com&twu=1&usg=ALkJrhhybTGW9zx9H30zrL1QCmxOmA4gQQ) ‘10, Special Foreign Affairs Correspondent – Expert (Russian Magazine) (Gevorg, August 24,”” <http://therearenosunglasses.wordpress.com/2010/08/24/does-usindia-strategic-alliance-leave-pakistan-out-in-the-cold/>)

However, if the partner exchange occurs too quickly, the region can expect to unpredictable consequences.Foremost is the destabilization of Pakistan. Islamabad is now totally dependent on American financial influence – as in the civilian sector (excluding U.S. aid budget will not be cut), and in the military (the U.S. spends billions of dollars on weapons of Pakistan and strengthen the capacity of its armed forces to fight militants). If the White House refuses alliance with Pakistan in favor of India, it will be very difficult to persuade Congress to continue the provision of the multibillion-dollar aid to Islamabad. Without this assistance, Pakistan is likely waiting for the financial collapse and a dramatic increase in the already weak separatist movements, especially in Baluchistan, where the majority of gas fields in the country, as well as in human Pashtun north-western regions. The situation is complicated by the presence in Pakistan of nuclear weapons (as the main rival of the country saw India, the majority of nuclear facilities have been deployed along the border with Afghanistan, is now teeming with Islamists). In the case of disintegration of the country’s nuclear components and documentation that might fall into the hands of the Taliban and then go to the international black market. His role in the destabilization of the play and the Pakistani generals. Guide Pakistani armed forces has long been experiencing complexes because of the superiority of India in the field of conventional weapons and considers the close relationship with the U.S. as a kind of protection against possible Indian intervention. If the shield disappears, Pakistan’s generals may think that the balance of power no longer, and that India wants to solve all our problems in Kashmir and Islamic militants with the help of a local operation against Islamabad. Or, more likely, against the background of irreversible disintegration processes in Pakistan, the Indians might be tempted to undertake jointly with China and the U.S. operation to deprive Pakistan of nuclear weapons. In this situation, Pakistan’s generals may be willing to **take extreme measures**. If the U.S. abandonment of Islamabad and withdraw from Afghanistan, Pakistan has become a classic failed state.However, unlike other similar countries (Sudan, Iraq, Myanmar), Pakistan would have enormous destabilizing effect on the entire region. 170 millionth Islamic country with nuclear weapons – to neutralize this threat will need concerted action of all regional great powers. Otherwise, **Central Asia will become a new Middle East**.

### Pakistan Economy

#### Pakistan collapse tanks the global economy

Walayat ‘10(Nadeem, financial analyst, editor of the Market Oracle, over 20 years experience of trading derivatives, portfolio management and analysing the financial markets, The Market Oracle, "Pakistan Collapse Could Trigger Global Great Depression and World War III," www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article16543.html, January 16, 2010)

Pakistan Collapse Could Trigger Global Great Depression and World War III During 2009 the 2600 terrorist attacks resulted in the number of deaths soaring to more than 12,000 casualties in Pakistan, compared to the number killed in Iraq falling to 2,800 from the 2008 total of 5,900. The U.S. War in Afghanistan pushed the Taliban and Al-Qeeda over the border into Pakistan that has sparked an escalating insurgency and Pakistan's own U.S. backed un-popular "War on Terror" which is going just as badly as that in Afghanistan, only without the deep financial pockets to embark up on an never ending war that is increasingly sapping what little strength the Pakistan Economy had out of it and now seriously risks the collapse of the state due to the stress of the conflict on the economy and society. The world appears to be sleep walking towards a mega-crisis during 2010 and beyond resulting from that of continuing and escalating terrorist insurgency fed by U.S. policy, that is spreading like a cancer across Pakistan resulting in the disintegration of the Pakistani economy and by consequence the disintegration of many areas of the state into lawless areas despite the size of the Pakistani Army, this would result in fallout across the whole region and the wider world on a scale of several magnitudes greater than that which followed the collapse of Iraq following the 2003 invasion. Pakistan populated by more than 170 million people could turn into a black hole that could swallow many more trillions of dollars in an escalating but ultimately unwinnable war on terror that would disrupt not only the economies of the west with hundreds of thousands more boots on the ground, but also the economies of the neighbouring states, especially India, Iran and China much as the war in Afghanistan had increasingly impacted on the Pakistani state and economy over the past few years. Not only is Pakistan's vast military industrial complex and arms stock piles at risk, but far more deadly than the IED's or klashnikovs are Pakistan's nuclear and chemical weapons that could greatly increase the risks of a series of dirty bombs emerging from within a failed state even if the nuclear weapons themselves remained secure. Therefore the Pakistan crisis has the potential for becoming a very significant factor when determining the direction of the global economy over the coming years due to both a mega refugee crisis that would emerge from a failed state and the conflagration of conflict across the region, unless action is taken to stabilise the situation in Pakistan towards which the following could form part of: 1. First world military technology such as drone air-craft and satellite surveillance made available to the Pakistan army to enable it to fight a more precise war against the Taliban Leadership without unpopular blanket warfare across regions of the country that only results in the conflict spreading and new recruits for the insurgency. Therefore Pakistan's War Against Terror needs to be greatly de-escalated rather than escalated, basically a strategy of containment of the Taliban in the Pushtoon areas rather invite more Pushtoon's to join the Taliban as a consequence of Pakistani Army actions. This would allow the rest of a more ethnically and culturally diverse Pakistan to stabilise rather than become sucked into an ever widening conflict. 2. To financially support and reform the Pakistan Government and economy into a self sustaining secular growth machine and as a far less corrupt entity than at present, much as the United States succeeded in turning the collapsed economies of Germany and Japan around following the second world war that would seek to pull Pakistan's people out of poverty and illiteracy, especially aimed at the impoverished youth that are increasingly falling pray to the Taliban ideology of holy war. The alternative of remaining on the present path risks the already debt saddled western worlds economies sowing the seeds of a Pakistan Collapse triggered Great Depression, much as many aspects of today's economic and financial crisis have their roots in both Afghanistan and Iraq and with even far worse consequences for the neighbouring states of Iran, India, China and perhaps Russia as the conflict falls out of Pakistan's borders. However at present U.S. and Western focus is primarily focused on bombing the Taliban and Al-Qeeda from the air and enticing the Pakistani army to embark on huge military expeditions against large regions of Pakistan, therefore not learning a single lesson from either Iraq or Afghanistan that the real solution is to win hearts and minds which cannot be done through carpet bombing of towns and cities but rather through building civil society and infrastructure. Unless action is taken now to change course then we may look back at the present in a few years time and say why did we not do something when we had the chance to prevent the Great Hyper-Inflationary Depression and resulting Global War much as the 1930's Great Deflationary Depression ultimately resulted in the Second World War.

#### Furthermore, Economic collapse kills millions and sparks great power wars

Duncan ’12 (Richard Duncan, Former IMF consultant, Financial sector specialist for the World Bank, Chief Economist Blackhorse Asset Management, The New Depression: The Breakdown of the Paper Money Economy, Page 12, Ebooks, 2012)

The political battle over America’s future would be bitter, and quite possibly bloody. It cannot be guaranteed that the U.S. Constitution would survive. Foreign affairs would also confront the United States with enormous challenges. During the Great Depression, the United States did not have a global empire. Now it does. The United States maintains hundreds of military bases across dozens of countries around the world. Added to this is a fleet of 11 aircraft carriers and 18 nuclear-armed submarines. The countryspends more than $650 billion a year on its military. If the U.S. economy collapsesinto a New Great Depression,the United States could not afford to maintain its worldwide military presence or to continue in its role as global peacekeeper.Or, at least, it could not finance its military in the same way it does at present. Therefore, either the United States would have to find an alternative funding method for its global military presence or else it would have to radically scale it back. Historically, empires were financed with plunder and territorial expropriation. The estates of the vanquished ruling classes were given to the conquering generals, while the rest of the population was forced to pay imperial taxes. The U.S. model of empire has been unique. It has financed its global military presence by issuing government debt, thereby taxing future generations of Americans to pay for this generation’s global supremacy. That would no longer be possible if the economy collapsed. Cost–benefit analysis would quickly reveal that much of America’s global presence was simply no longer affordable. Many—or even most—of the outposts that did not pay for themselves would have to be abandoned. Priority would be given to those places that were of vital economic interests to the United States. The Middle East oil fields would be at the top of that list. The United States would have to maintain control over them whatever the price**.** In this global depression scenario, the price of oil could collapse to $3 per barrel**.** Oil consumption would fall by half and there would be no speculators left to manipulate prices higher. Oil at that level would impoverish the oil-producing nations, with extremely destabilizing political consequences**.** Maintaining control over the Middle East oil fields would become much more difficult for the United States. It would require a much larger military presence than it does now. On the one hand, it might become necessary for the United States to reinstate the draft (which would possibly meet with violent resistance from draftees, as it did during the Vietnam War). On the other hand, America’s all-volunteer army might find it had more than enough volunteers with the national unemployment rate in excess of 20 percent. The army might have to be employed to keep order at home, given that mass unemployment would inevitably lead to a sharp spike in crime. Only after the Middle East oil was secured would the country know how much more of its global military presence it could afford to maintain. If international trade had broken down, would there be any reason for the United States to keep a military presence in Asia when there was no obvious way to finance that presence?In a global depression, the United States’ allies in Asia would most likely be unwilling or unable to finance America’s military bases there or to pay for the upkeep of the U.S. Pacific fleet**.** Norwould the United States have the strength to force them to pay for U.S. protection**.** Retreat from Asia might become unavoidable. And Europe?What would a cost–benefit analysis conclude about the wisdom of the United States maintaining military bases there? What valued added does Europe provide to the United States? Necessity may mean Europe will have to defend itself**.** Should a New Great Depression put an end to the Pax Americana, the world would become a much more dangerous place**.** When the Great Depression began, Japan was the rising industrial power in Asia. It invaded Manchuria in 1931 and conquered much of the rest of Asia in the early 1940s. Would China, Asia’s new rising power, behave the same way in the event of a new global economic collapse? Possibly. China is the only nuclear power in Asia east of India (other than North Korea, which is largely a Chinese satellite state). However**,** in this disaster scenario, it is not certain that China would survive in its current configuration.Its economy would be in ruins. Most of its factories and banks would be closed. Unemployment could exceed 30 percent**.** There would most likely be starvation both in the cities and in the countryside. The Communist Party could lose its grip on power, in which case the country could break apart**,** as it has numerous times in the past. It was less than 100 years ago that China’s provinces, ruled by warlords, were at war with one another.United or divided, China’s nuclear arsenal would make it Asia’s undisputed superpower if the United States were to withdrawfrom the region. From Korea and Japan in the North to New Zealand in the South to Burma in the West,all of Asia would be at China’s mercy**.** And hunger among China’s population of 1.3 billion people could necessitate territorial expansion into Southeast Asia. In fact, the central government might not be able to prevent mass migration southward, even if it wanted to. In Europe, severe economic hardship would revive the centuries-old struggle between the left and the right**.** During the 1930s, the Fascists movement arose and imposed a police state on most of Western Europe. In the East, the Soviet Union had become a communist police state even earlier. The far right and the far left of the political spectrum converge in totalitarianism**.** It is difficult to judge whether Europe’s democratic institutions would hold up better this time that they did last time. England had an empire during the Great Depression. Now it only has banks. In a severe worldwide depression, the country—or, at least London—could become ungovernable. Frustration over poverty and a lack of jobs would erupt into anti-immigration riots not only in the United Kingdom but also across most of Europe. The extent to which Russia would menace its European neighbors is unclear. On the one hand,Russia would be impoverished by the collapse in oil prices and might be too preoccupied with internal unrest to threaten anyone. On the other hand, it could provoke a war with the goal of maintaining internal order through emergency wartime powers**.** Germany is very nearly demilitarized today when compared with the late 1930s. Lacking a nuclear deterrent of its own, it could be subject to Russian intimidation. While Germany could appeal for protection from England and France, who do have nuclear capabilities, it is uncertain that would buy Germany enough time to remilitarize before it became a victim of Eastern aggression. As for the rest of the world, its prospects in this disaster scenario can be summed up in only a couple of sentences. Global economic output could fall by as much as half, from $60 trillion to $30 trillion.Not all of the world’s seven billion people would survive in a $30 trillion global economy. Starvation would be widespread. Food riots would provoke political upheaval and myriad big and small conflicts around the world. It would be a humanitarian catastrophe so extreme as to be unimaginablefor the current generation, who, at least in the industrialized world, has known only prosperity**.** Nor would there be reason to hope that theNew GreatDepression would end quickly**.** The Great Depression was only ended by an even more calamitous global war that killed approximately 60 million people.

### Pakistan Russia/CCP Collapse

#### Central Asia instability leads to Chinese and Russian instability

Peimani ‘2 (Hooman, University of Bradford Central Asia specialist, University of Bradford Department of Peace Studies Central Asia and Caucasus specialist, “Failed transition, Bleak future?: War and Instability in Central Asia and the Caucasus”, ebschost ebook, pg. 134, 2002)

Apart from internal factors, certain external factors have further convinced these governments of the merits of authoritarianism. Radical ethnic movements in countries in their proximity or in those neighboring their regions have certainly alarmed them. The ethnic makeup of the Caucasian and CA countries makes the expansion of ethnic movements in violent and nonviolent forms from one country to another a feasible scenario. The existence of the same ethnic groups on both sides of the borders between Central Asia and their neighboring China and Afghanistan has also created a potential for the expansion of an ethnic conflict (China) and a civil war (Afghanistan) to the CA countries. In particular, the continuation of instability in Afghanistan has created a well­founded anxiety, which has lasted in the post­Taliban era as the overall situation in Afghanistan has created grounds for a new round of civil war. Civil war and instability in that country could potentially even radicalize the ethnic minorities of Russia and is thus a concern for the Russians, who have also used it as a pretext for their return to their former CA republics. Besides this political incentive, it is a fact that instability in the Caucasus and Central Asia neighboring Russia could expand to that country and vice versa. Until the fall of the Taliban, China’s fear of the expansion of extremism and terrorism from Taliban­dominated Afghanistan to its troubled Xinjiang Province via its neighboring Central Asia also had realistic grounds. In the absence of the Taliban, the persistence of political uncertainty in Afghanistan should still make the Chinese fearful of the spillover of instability and extremism, as dissatisfied Afghan groups could resume the civil war—an undesirable but still feasible scenario. The shared fear of expansion of instability have justified cooperation among most of the Caucasian and CA countries with China and Russia within the context of the CIS collective security agreement and also that of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

#### Russian collapse causes extinction

Oliker And Charlick-Paley ‘2 (Olga and Tanya, RAND Corporation Project Air Force, “Assessing Russia’s Decline,” [www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1442/](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1442/), 2002)

The preceding chapters have illustrated the ways in which Russia’s decline affects that country and may evolve into challenges and dangers that extend well beyond its borders. The political factors of decline may make Russia a less stable international actor and other factors may increase the risk of internal unrest. Together and separately, they increase the risk of conflict and the potential scope of other imaginable disasters. The trends of regionalization, particularly the disparate rates of economic growth among regions, combined with the politicization of regional economic and military interests, will be important to watch. The potential for locale, or possibly ethnicity, to serve as a rallying point for internal conflict is low at present, but these factors have the potential to feed into precisely the cycle of instability that political scientists have identified as making states in transition to democracy more likely to become involved in war. These factors also increase the potential for domestic turmoil, which further increases the risk of international conflict, for instance if Moscow seeks to united a divided nation and/or demonstrate globally that its waning power remains something to be reckoned with. Given Russia’s conventional weakness, an increased risk of conflict carries with it an increased risk of nuclear weapons use, and Russia’s demographic situation increases the potential for a major epidemic with possible implications for Europe and perhaps beyond. The dangers posed by Russia’s civilian and military nuclear weapons complex, aside from the threat of nuclear weapons use, create a real risk of proliferation of weapons or weapons materials to terrorist groups, as well as perpetuating an increasing risk of accident at one of Russia’s nuclear power plants or other facilities. These elements touch upon key security interests, thus raising serious concerns for the United States. A declining Russia increases the likelihood of conflict—internal or otherwise—and the general deterioration that Russia has in common with “failing” states raises serious questions about its capacity to respond to an emerging crisis. A crisis in large, populous, and nuclear-armed Russia can easily affect the interests of the United States and its allies. In response to such a scenario, the United States, whether alone or as part of a larger coalition, could be asked to send military forces to the area in and around Russia. This chapter will explore a handful of scenarios that could call for U.S. involvement. A wide range of crisis scenarios can be reasonably extrapolated from the trends implicit in Russia’s decline. A notional list includes: Authorized or unauthorized belligerent actions by Russia troops in trouble-prone Russian regions or in neighboring states could lead to armed conflict. Border clashes with China in the Russian Far East or between Russia and Ukraine, the Baltic states, Kazakhstan, or another neighbor could escalate into interstate combat. Nuclear-armed terrorists based in Russia or using weapons or materials diverted from Russian facilities could threaten Russia, Europe, Asia, or the United States. Civil war in Russia could involve fighting near storage sites for nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and agents, risking large-scale contamination and humanitarian disaster. A nuclear accident at a power plant or facility could endanger life and health in Russia and neighboring states. A chemical accident at a plant or nuclear or nuclear-related facility could endanger life and health in Rusisa and neighboring states. Ethnic pogrom in south Russia could force refugees into Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and/or Ukraine. Economic and ethnic conflicts in Caucasus could erupt into armed clashes, which would endanger oil and gas pipelines in the region. A massive ecological disaster such as an earthquake, famine, or epidemic could spawn refugees and spread illness and death across borders. An increasingly criminalized Russian economy could create a safe haven for crime or even terrorist-linked groups. From this base, criminals, drug traders, and terrorists could threaten the people and economies of Europe, Asia, and the United States. Accelerated Russian weapons and technology sales or unauthorized diversion could foster the proliferation of weapons and weapon materials to rogue states and nonstate terrorist actors, increasing the risk of nuclear war.

#### CCP collapse causes extinction

Yee ‘2 (Herbert and Ian, Associate Professor of Government @ Hong Kong Baptist University, and Storey, Asian-Pacific Center for Security Studies, China Threat: Perception, Myths, and Reality, 2002)

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a china threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbounng countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented china could also result in another nightmare scenario — nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.

### Pakistan- US/ Russian War

#### Central Asian war risks accidental launch with Russia

Schorr ‘1 (Ira Schorr, Analyst with the Institute for Policy Studies, “The Record”, Lexis, October 14, 2001)

While these actions helped the nuclear superpowers back away from using weapons of mass destruction at a precarious time, it's sobering to note that the United States and Russia are still courting nuclear disaster. Despite no longer being strategic foes they still maintain thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert -- poised for a quick launch. This is a threat that no missile defense system will ever be able to protect us from. This process of keeping nuclear weapons on a hair-trigger means that leaders on both sides have just minutes to assess whether a warning of an attack is real or false. And while the threats we faced during the Cold War came from Soviet strength -- the danger today comes more from Russia's weakness. For example, Russia's troubled economy has led to the profound decay of its early warning satellite system. A fire last May that destroyed a critical facility used to control Russian warning satellites has made things even worse. "Russia has completely lost its space-based early warning capabilities," says Bruce Blair of the Center for Defense Information. "In essence, the country's ability to tell a false alarm from a real warning has been nearly crippled. " False alarms on both sides have already brought us to the brink of nuclear war. What will happen now if there is a war in the volatile neighborhood of Central Asia -- a region that includes nuclear powers India, Pakistan, and Russia? Former Sen. Sam Nunn brought the point home in a recent speech: "The events of Sept. 11 gave President Bush very little time to make a very difficult decision -- whether to give orders to shoot down a commercial jetliner filled with passengers. Our current nuclear posture in the United States and Russia could provide even less time for each president to decide on a nuclear launch that could destroy our nations. " Nunn called on Presidents Bush and Putin to "stand-down" their nuclear forces to "reduce toward zero the risk of accidental launch or miscalculation and provide increased launch decision time for each president. " In the spirit of the courageous steps his father took to decrease the nuclear threat 10 years ago, President Bush should take action now to remove nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert. This would send a signal to the world that in this volatile time, the U.S. is serious about preventing the use of nuclear weapons.

#### US/Russian war is existential

Bostrum 2 (Nick, PhD and Professor of Philosophy @ Oxford, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,” The Journal of Evolution and Technology, March)

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn4)